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PREFACE 
Senator Symington: Mr. Rumsfeld, when you come before this com-
mittee you come before a very friendly committee. It has been 
my experience after thirty-one years in the government that you 
have four kinds of senators and congressmen. After World War I 
a group of people came here who voted for all of the guns before 
any butter. And the resistance that developed over the years, 
especially incident to the no-win procedures, resulted in another 
group coming up who voted for all the butter instead of any of 
the guns. Then you have another group who could be the most 
dangerous of all, based on my concept of true national security, 
who say well we will vote for all the butter and all the guns 
and we are sure to come back with a heavy majority, because 
nothing could every happen to the U. S. dollar. In that connection 
I was recently talking to the fiscal expert of the Senate, and 
I told him that the retired military pay between now and the 
year 2000 would add up to 300 billion dollars. He said the 
figure was too high. I asked the Chief of Staff, Mr. Braswell, 
to get me the figures. The memorandum from Mr. Braswell shows 
that if nothing is done the accumulated retirement pay that 
will go out is not 150 billion, it is not 300 billion, it is 
470 billion. 
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on 
Armed Services. Hearings. Nomination 
of Donald Rumsfeld to be Secretary of 
Defense, 94th Congress, 1st sess. 1975, 
pp. 17-18. 
In August of 1974, I wrote U. S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., the 
senior Virginia senator and T. Edward Braswell, Chief Counsel for the Senate 
Armed Services Committee for a good deal of material concerning the United 
States military pension system. 
The system had intrigued me as a pension planner for many years for 
several reasons. First, the plan itself possessed grave design defects, which 
if allowed to exist in private plans would lead the employer corporation to 
excessive cost and possibly fiscal insolvency. Second, with the quadrupling of 
the price of oil in 1974 and the creation of a cohesive oil cartel it seemed 
possible to predict that the delicate balance of costs-benefits-inflation upon 
which the 500,000 private plans rested for fiscal integrity was in real danger 
of becoming unseated from new economic forces over which there was no control 
and for which we had no experience. One could foresee a rash of private plan 
terminations and also a runaway military retirement system, both of which sadly 
took place and are continuing to take place as these words are written. 
From the material sent me by Messrs. Byrd and Braswell, mainly docu-
ments from DoD and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) plus hearings and 
transcripts and statistical data of all kinds dealing with the retirement system 
and efforts to contain it, I was able to determine that the subject was worthy 
of a major effort on my:part to attempt to provide something of value. 
The timing by pure chance was exquisite. Attempts at military pension 
reform had begun in 1971. It seemed that the appropriate congressional commit-
tees would turn to a final effort within a reasonable time after the blue ribbon 
President's Commission on Miltiary Compensation, appointed in 1977, rendered its 
report to the President in April 1978. 
I decided to try to write in simple language the first in-depth article 
on the subject designed for a specialized readership. The article, "The United 
States Military Pension System -- To Halt a Runaway", was published in October 
1977 in the CLU Journal, a professional quarterly with a readership of 25,000 
specialists from the various fields of financial planning. From the article 
came an invitation to testify before the President's Commission and an opportunity 
to be allowed to make a degree of input into the coming political process itself. 
ii 
The reader will note that throughout the thesis there is the implied 
principle that in a participatory democracy the citizenry should and must take 
an active role in the spending of funds given by it to the government in the 
form of taxes. We must never again hold the politician in awe or, in the 
magnificent words of Dean Raoul Berger during the darkest hours of Watergate, 
he will again become awesome. 
A sincere debt of thanks is owed to the following for their help and 
guidance: to John Outland, my friend and thesis advisor, whose courses I enjoyed 
so much and whose suggestions and criticisms were always to the mark; to John 
Whelan who gave me without complaint generous amounts of his time, his library 
and his gift of near-total recall; to Warren Nelson who fed me a constant supply 
of papers, testimony and reports from his position as Congressman Les Aspin's 
legislative assistant; and finally to Gary Nelson, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense and friend, who saw that my source material was always of high 
quality including much of his own work. I thank them all from my heart. 
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T 0 L E E 
The United States Military Pension System 
-- Toward a Rational Reform, with 
Commentary on the Report of the 
President's Commission on Military Compensation 
CHAPTER I 
Problem and Prognosis 
In addressing the subject of military compensation, we 
feel that we must first address the financial condition of the 
United States government today. We are not speaking of the pub-
lic debt figure as announced by the United States Treasury, of 
712 billion dollars that is announced in the daily financial 
statement~ As taxpayers we are much more concerned by a more 
awesome figure, the real debt of the U. S. government -- a figure 
that now approaches 8 trillion dollars. This figure is not 
dreamed up. It is based upon the State of Liabilities and other 
Financial Commitments of the United States Government (31 USC 
757 f) and reflects the summary of real public debt as of July 1, 
1977. 
From statement of Sid Taylor, 
Research Director, National Tax-
payers Union, before the President's 
Commission on Military Compensation, 
December 21, 1977. 
The day is upon us when we can no longer postpone a reappraisal of 
our nation's military plan, for it represents a system in a degree of disarray 
approaching chaos. It is a system which provides benefits of a magnitude un-
heard of in the private sector -- benefits which have been judged to be up to 
ten times more generous than those provided by private plans and three times 
as great as those of the federal civil service system. 1 
1It is difficult to fairly affect a comparison of benefits between pension 
plans because of the various features which have different values. It is the 
author's belief that the figure of ten is low. The President's Commission 
reached a conclusion somewhat close to ten on page 31 of its report. The 
New York Times, April 11, 1978, page 22, estimated the difference at ten. 
The U. S. News and World Report, April 24, 1978, listed the difference in 
lifetime payout as tenfold. 
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It is a system which is escalating sharply in cost. By fiscal year 
2000, if left alone, the annual outlay for military pensions will total $34 
billion as against $9.5 billion for fiscal year 1978. However, should the 
plan be put on a funded basis, it is estimated that the cost for fiscal year 
1979 along would total $16.7 billion. 2 
In terms of cost-to-payroll, the military expenditure is approximately 
six times greater than the norm in private industry, requiring some 40% to 55% 
of military payroll as contrasted with approximately 8% in the private sector. 3 
It is to these abnormalities and distortions in costs and benefits that the 
author's thesis is directed. 
No attempt will be made therein to suggest the emasculation of the 
United States military retirement plan or the financial degradation of the men 
and women who serve therein. The author is fully aware of the patriotism, the 
Rersonal dedication, the hardship, the separation from family that a military 
career often requires of those who chose it. Nor is the author unaware that 
periodically, three times within the last thirty years, the supreme price in 
life and limb was extracted from them. But there can be nothing but an utter 
waste of taxpayer funds when benefits of a level such as these are provided in 
times so fraught with uncertainty. 
While plans of workers in private industry provide a benefit level of 
approximately 50% of earnings inclusive of Social Security, the military system 
2u. S. Congress Congressional Budget Office. Retirement Accounting Changes: 
Budget and Policy Impacts .. Background paper. April 1977. pp. 6-9. 
3Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force. 
R-1450-ARPA. Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corporation. 1977. 
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yields 75% of basic pay exclusive of Social Security, and indexed to the 
Consumer Price Index for cost-of-living adjustments.4 
The following table shows two average retirements under the United 
States military retirement plan; one for an 0-6 Colonel or Captain (N), and 
one for an E-7 Sergeant or CPO (N). The table is designed to show retirements 
with a 5% Consumer Price Index improvement to age 65. The Social Security 
benefit assumes no reentry to the labor force from service retirement to age 
65. The pension is extended to the life expectancy of a modern mortality 
table, and the lifetime military payout is indicated. The percent of pension 
to pay is also indicated. The dollars are in 1977 dollars: 
Table 1-1 
Effect of Social Security and CPI .on Military Pension 
Retirement Age . • . . • 
Beginning Monthly Pension . 
Military Monthly Pension at Age 65 
Social Secuirty at Age 65 . 
Total Monthly Pension at Age 65 • 
Percent Pension to Pay at Age 65 
Lifetime Military Payout . . . . 
0-6 Colonel 
Captain (N) 
52 
$ 1,886 
3,383 
253 
3,636 
193 
1,080,182 
Rank 
E-7 Sergeant First Class 
CPO (N) 20-year career 
41 
$ 455 
1,467 
186 
1,653 
151 
446,392 
Source: The table is the author's own. 
The Social Security rates are those which 
reflect legislation to 1975. The military 
pay rates are those applicable currently. 
4The Bankers Trust Company offers the interested reader perhaps the most 
complete analysis of private retirement plan statistics. See Bankers Trust 
Company, 1975 Study of Corporate Pension Plans. New York. 1975. 
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The President's Commission in its report constructed a somewhat 
similar table but designed to illustrate the difference in lifetime payout 
between officers and enlisted personnel of the services to those of the military 
of other states, as well as civilian private sector employees: 
Table 1-2 
Lifetime Value of Military Retirement Under Different Retirement Provisions 
Retirement Plan 
Officers: 
U. S. military 
Typical private sector (salary) 
Typical non-federal public 
(example: municipali~y) 
Federal Civil Service 
Typical police and fireman plan (a) 
West German military (b) 
British military 
Canadian military (c) 
Enlisted persons: 
U. S. military 
Typical private sector (wage) 
Typical non-federal public 
Federal Civil Service 
Typical police and fireman plan (a) 
West German military (b) 
British military 
Canadian military (c) 
20 Years of Service 
Life Pay- Age 
out Value Annuity 
Begins 
$420,000 43 
40,000 62 
70,000 60 
90,000 60 
260,000 50 
not entitled 
350,000 43 
360,000 43 
190,000 39 
15,000 62 
20,000 60 
25,000 60 
90,000 50 
not entitled 
not entitled 
165,000 40 
30 Years of 
Life Pay-
out Value 
$590,000 
135,000 
225,000 
465,000 
575,000 
880,000 
490,000 
550,000 
280,000 
45,000 
70,000 
155,000 
265,000 
360,000 
215,000 
260,000 
(b) 
Service 
Age 
Annuity 
Begins 
53 
62 
60 
55 
53 
53 
53 
53 
49 
62 
60 
55 
50 
52 
49 
49 
Source: The Report of the President's 
Commission on Military Compensation. 
Table 3-2, p. 32. 
The estimated payout figures in the above table represent 
the lifetime value of retired pay in fiscal year 1978 dollars at the 
time the person completes 20 or 30 years of service. Social Security 
payments are not included in the estimates. For annuities protected 
from inflatio~ pensions remain in fiscal year 1978 dollars until death. 
When annuities have no CPI protection or partial CPI protection, future 
pensions are deflated to convert to 1978 dollars. The estimates 
assume 4% annual inflation. Estimates assume enlisted members 
enter at age 19, and officers enter at age 23. 
The lack of inflation protection accounts for a large 
part of the difference in lifetime values between the military 
programs and the civilian programs. References to private pen-
sion plans are assumed to have no protection from inflation. 
(a) For 30 years of service it is assumed that an 
enlisted person enters at age 20 and retires at age 50, the 
earliest age the typical policeman or fireman can retire. 
(b) The West German military does not allow retire-
ment until age 52 and does not provide for deferred annuities. 
Therefore, estimates for enlisted persons with 30 years of ser-
vice assume an entry age of 22 with annuity beginning at age 52. 
Note: th~ figure of $880,000 [sic] is an error in the Commis-
sion's calculations. The German benefit formula contains the 
same maximum as that of the U. S. Since the pay is comparable 
also and the annuity cannot begin until age 55, the error is 
obvious. The figure should be approximately the same as that 
for the U. S. for the officer classification. 
(c) The, Canadian military does not allow retirement 
before age 40. Es~imate for 20-year enlisted person assumes 
entry age at 20 with annuity beginning at age 40. 
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With Table 1-2 the Commission was clearly of the opinion that a great 
difference existed between the United States military pension payout as between 
officer and employee; and as between enlisted person and worker. It is the 
thesis of this author that the military retirement plan should be reasonable 
in benefits and costs and at least in rough parity with the plans of the non-
military taxpayer whose taxes fund it. 
Origin of Problem 
While the military retirement system may now well be in a dangerous 
state of imbalance as to benefits-and-costs, it is but a part of a larger pro-
blem, that of the entire pension concept. There are three basic types of 
pension systems in America. They are the private sector, non-government 
plans; the governmental-administered plans containing the railroad workers, 
ederal civilian employees, state and local employees and the military; the 
hird system is the Social Security old age plan (OASDI). 5 
Table 1-3 
Plan 
Private plans (a) 
Railroad Retirement 
Federal civilian employees 
State and local employees 
Social Security System 
Military 
Number of Persons Covered 
42,000,000 
1,600,000 
4,000,000 
11,000,000 
109,000,000 
2,100,000 
Source: American Council of Life 
Insurance, Pension Facts 1976. 
New York. 1977. 
(a) Of the 42,000,000 persons indicated, some 10,000,000 are 
members of profit sharing plans, thus leaving the pension 
membership at:over 30,000,000. 
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Two events occurred oddly within thirty-six months of each other in 
1974 to bring into focus. the peril which now confronts the American pension 
systems. The first was the Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
which was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on Labor Day of that year. 
It sought to mandate monetary protections to workers in the form of strict 
funding standards of their plans by their employers and in this respect was 
entirely laudable. However, the timing of the passage of this extremely complex 
legislation was unfortunate as it coincided roughly with the Arab oil embargo, 
the quadrupling of oil prices, a major recession and severe inflation. Under 
prior pension law, the Internal Revenue Service had historically taken a con-
ciliatory attitude toward private employers who either from desire or necessity 
5American Council of Life Insurance, Pension Facts 1976. New York. p. 19. 
This source is excellent for pension data through 1975. 
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had allowed their defined benefit pension plans to become underfunded. Defined 
benefit plans, numbering some 400,000,cover the major portion of the labor 
6 force. These plans provide definite, ascertainable benefits which are com-
puted by formula. The military plan is of this type. However, the military 
plan is unfunded, i.e., the benefits are paid each year from the general revenues 
of the government. Also unfunded or severely underfunded are many plans in the 
public systems, i.e., the plans of the counties, cities and states. 
Also in long range danger is the fiscal integrity of the Social 
Security old age system (OASDI). This condition was temporarily alleviated 
when on December 20, 1977, President Carter signed into law the largest peace 
time tax increase in history. This measure mandated a series of increases 
beginning in 1979 for Social Security payroll taxes which will raise 227 
million dollars of additional revenue in the years 1979 through 1987. Its 
stated purpose was to end the deficits which had been building in the Social 
Security trust funds. Under present law, the disability trust fund would be 
depleted by 1979, the old age trust fund by 1982. In reality, this shoring 
up of the largest of all the public systems foretold of the problems and dangers 
which now exist across the entire spectrum of all the systems -- private as well 
as public -- problems which are only now beginning to be defined and problems 
for which there exist at present little or no consensus of thought for remedial 
action. 
The problems now facing the private sector funded plans (but under-
funded) may be described so that the reader may also understand a major part 
6The actual figure is, at present unknown. Prior to the passage of ERISA, 
there were approximately 470,000 defined benefit pension plans. Due to the 
constraints of the Act plus the recession of 1973, there is the distinct pos-
sibility that almost one-third of these plans have been or are now being terminated. 
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of the reason for the escalation of the costs of the unfunded public plans 
such as that of the military. For the major reason -- the inflationary wage 
and pension increase -- is a common thread which runs through the fabric of 
both the systems, threatening the employer with a plan curtailment or termina-
tion in the case of the former, and the taxpayer base of the nation with 
excessive costs in the case of the latter. 7 
The optimum form of pension -- or so it has been thought is the 
fixed benefit, final average-pay plan. Here a definite benefit is provided 
by formula upon a percentage of pay as it exists just prior to retirement. 
These plans worked with success during period of low inflation, i.e. when 
average yearly increases were 2% to 2.5% to 3%, for the following reasons: 
When an actuary calculates the cost of a defined benefit, final 
pay pension plan which ±nvolves determining the annual contribution rate 
needed to support the plan, he must make assumptions concerning many future 
events. Among these events are mortality, turnover of employment due to 
severance, age at retirement, rate of return on invested reserves, and career 
salary increases. In general he makes no assumption regarding the rate of 
inflation, but when inflation is in the 2% to 2.5% range, there is room in the 
other assumptions regarding the rate of investment yield to accommodate that 
degree of rise. In effect, the plans are open-ended; the costs are never pre-
dictible; at best it is only with difficulty that they can be made subject to 
long range planning. Rates of inflation higher than expected upset the delicate 
balance between what can and what cannot be planned. 
7For a superb in depth discussion of the current state of the private pension 
system, the interested reader should read Robert D. Paul, "Can Private Pension 
Plans Deliver?", Harvard Business Review, October 1974, pp. 1-8. The author, at 
the point of the beginning of a new plateau in inflation, predicts with accuracy 
what is apparent four years later. 
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For example, a typical assumption might be that salaries could be 
projected to rise an average of 2% to 3% per year. This is a projection which 
increases the employer contribution. With a 3% salary progression, a partici-
pant who starts employment at $5,000 per year is assumed to be earning $14,000 
prior to retirement 35 years later; an employee who enters employment at 
$10,000 is progressed to $28,000 and so on. This increase is built into the 
cost calculation. So, however, is the yield on invested reserves which is 
currently figured at about 6%. Actually, the yield has normally been 2% or 
3% higher than_ the assumption, and this difference historically could cover 
minimal inflation so long as it was in the 2% to 2.5% range. 
But in 1973 the CPI rose 9.4%. We had entered a new world of eco-
nomics. The age of cheap energy had come to an abrupt halt. Between 1968 -
1975, for example, the cost-of-living adjustments for the retirees of the 
military pension system averaged 8.5% per year while the average basic pay 
increase for the same period averaged 10.5%. 8 If in the next decade the rate 
of inflation is 5% to 10%, pension plans now in effect will require investment 
returns of 10% to 13% a year to maintain costs at anywhere near a level per-
cent of payroll. 
The increase in pension cost from pay increases flowing from the new 
world of inflation is striking. For instance, in a typical defined benefit 
pension plan, military or private sector, assume that a 25-year old participant 
enters plan membership with a starting salary of $8,000. The plan provides a 
8For the interested reader, see concise description of the military system, 
examples and pay ranges of personnel as well as retirement pay by rank and years 
of service in the Uniformed Services Almanac published each year. See page 44 
of the 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac. Washington, D. C. 1977. 
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pension at retirement of 50% of final-average salary averaged over the last 
five years of employment. If the salary increases are in range of 2% to 3% 
per year, the amount necessary to fund the pension would be $84,900. But 
if additional increases of 5% or 7.5% are granted at different times to off-
set inflation, the amount needed for that participant would soar to between 
$325,000 to $600,000 plus. 9 "In our inflationary future", notes author Paul 
"employees and employers -- in fact, the society as a whole -- will be faced 
with apparently irreconcilable alternatives: automatic cost-of-living increases 
in pensions (and pension costs) versus fixed benefits (with declining purchas-
ing power). The economy may not be able to support the first; society may not 
be able to accept the second. A question is raised: can our pension promises 
be kept?1110 
; 
The reader may at this point suspect that he has been led into an 
unnecessary foray involving an over-exposure of basic pension planning mixed 
with fragments of rudimentary economics. But it has been for a purpose, since 
a degree of familiarity with retirement planning in general will be of help to 
the interested reader. What has been suggested is that a pension plan is a 
device which is uniquely ill-equipped to cope with high and mounting inflation. 
In the private sector thousands of plans have been and are being terminated 
because of it -- in large part. The plan of the military is subject to the 
same pressures. However, the United States military retirement system, of 
course, will not be terminated nor will the plans of the other public systems. 
This thesis suggests that the taxpayer base of the nation is the de facto 
9 Paul, op. cit., p. 3, Exhibit 1. 
lOibid., p. 6. 
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employer of these systems. It is, therefore, in the public's interest to see 
that the plans are kept reasonable in benefits and costs. Indeed, it is no less 
than a duty. 11 
11The author was gratified to see that the President's Commission on 
Military Compensation was of the same opinion. Its core recommendation was 
for a realignment of the military benefit structure downward. Its reasoning 
was that the present disparity in benefits resulted in an inequity. Report 
of the President's Commission on Military Compensation. Washington, D. C., 
Government Printing Office, 1978. 
CHAPTER II 
Background and Description of Present Pension System 
The current system was originally intended to keep 
Federal pay (both military and civilian) competitive with wages 
in the civilian sector, but it has evolved to the point where 
far more than necessary is paid. Summing all the components of 
the compensation package reveals that military officers, for 
example, earn about 70 percent more and enlisted personnel 
about 30 percent more, than comparably aged and educated civilian 
workers. This did not happen by design but by accident. 
Richard V. L. Cooper, Military 
Manpower and the All-Volunteer 
Force. The Rand Corporation. 1977. 
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The American military nondisability pension plan is technically 
extremely simple. 1 In r~tirement plan language it is a defined benefit pen-
sion plan with a unit benefit formula which provides a monthly benefit of 
2.5% of final basic pay times years of service. The benefit is in the form 
of a life annuity, and it commences immediately upon retirement which can be 
at any time (for most grades and ranks) between the 20th and 30th years. It 
is not off set by the applicable Social Security benefit and is indexed for 
cost-of-living adjustments to the CPI. Benefits vest at the 20th year. The 
system is unfunded. Thus, applications of the benefit formula to a 20-year 
1Title 10; United States Code. Military retirement is, of course, a part 
of compensation and, as such, was expressly delegated to the legislative branch 
by the framers in Article one, Section eight of the Constitution. It is not 
unusual, however, for inquiries into potentially volatile and explosive issues 
such as military pension reform to be spearheaded by a blue ribbon President's 
Commission. President Kennedy appointed a similar commission to define the 
parameters of private pension reform in March of 1962. 
career will produce a benefit of 50% of final basic pay while a benefit of 
75% of basic pay is produced for a career of 30 years. 
The compensation package of the military is extremely complex, 
comprising some 30 odd items. 2 It is largely for this reason that the 
military man has never known exactly what he made and indeed today bases a 
portion of his resistance to any proposed changes in his retirement to this 
lack of understanding. His pension benefits, however, are based upon his 
main cash item called basic pay. 
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Most analysts, as well as the author, choose the middle sixties as 
the point to begin any examination of the present compensation-retirement 
system. It is about at that time that the ratio of military pay to compar-
able civilian pay stood at its lowest. Also it was then that American involve-
ment in Southeast Asia was begun in earnest. A final reason for choosing the 
mid-sixties as a point of departure is that from the end of World War II 
through the 1950s there were relatively few changes in compensation rates and 
retirement policies, the main ones being the introduction of reenlistment 
bonuses in 1952, the Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniform 
Services (CHAMPUS) in 1956, and proficiency pay in 1958. 3 
2 For excellent description of the items which are included as compensation 
for the American military see Martin Binkin, The Military Pay Muddle. 
Washington, D. c. The Brookings Institute. 1975. See also Report of the 
President's Connnission on Military Compensation. Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1978. p. 9. 
3Richard v. L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force. 
Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corporation, 1977. P· 259. 
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Retirement and Pay Prior to Vietnam 
In 1964 basic pay and retirement at representative grades and ranks 
were as indicated in Table 2-1, which shows total cash pay and basic pay for 
a 20 and 30-year career. The total pay and cash allowances column in Table 
2-1 reflects the disgraceful level of military pay in effect in 1964. 
Table 2-1 
1964 Domestic Duty Pay and Pension (a) 
Total Pay Monthly Mo. Pension Mo. Pension 
and Cash Basic 20 Years 30 Years 
Grade Allowances Pay (b) Service Service 
0-6 Colonel or 
Captain (N) $1,163 $945 $473 $814 
0-4 Major or 
Lt. Commander (N) 933 740 370 555 
0-3 Captain or 
Lieutenant (N) 818 640 320 480 
E-6 Staff Sgt. or 
CPO (N) 478 330 165 248 
E-5 Sgt. or 
Petty Officer 
2nd Class (N) 423 280 140 210 
E-4.Corporal or 
Petty Officer 
3rd Class (N) (c) 358 215 108 161 
E-3 Private 
1st Class or 
Seaman Recruit (N) 308 165 83 124 
Source: Uniformed Services Almanac. op. cit. 
Military pay for enlisted personnel during their first two years of 
service had, by 1965, fallen to about half the comparable civilian rate. 4 Indeed, 
when the Gates Commission rendered its recommendations to the President in 1969, 
military pay was still substandard, especially when considered as a mechanism 
for encouraging an all-volunteer army. The commission noted: 
4 
Ibid., p. 103. 
Military compensation in the early years of service is now 
so low that it will not sustain an all-volunteer force of 
the quality desired. Until that condition is corrected an 
all-volunteer force cannot be realized.5 
It is interesting as well to note in historical perspective the comparison 
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between compensation of the military to compensation of the civilian sector. 
Table 2-2 sets forth the comparison of enlisted earnings to civilian pay in 
manufacturing. 
Table 2-2 
Comparison of Annual Military Enlisted Earnings 
with Average Annual Earnings in Manufacturing 
Period 
Civil War (1865) 
Spanish-American War (1898) 
World War I (1918) 
World War II (1945) 
Korean War (1952) 
1960 
1965 
Annual Military Manufacturing Percent of 
Pay & Allowances Earnings Forces Drafted 
$ 427 $ 410 2 
444 394 0 
870 980 59 
1,587 2,469 61 
2,584 3,721 27 
3,034 5,020 15 
3,567 6,130 16 
Source: Richard V. L. Cooper. Military 
Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force. 
Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corp-
oration, 1977. Table 4-1. p. 52. 
The reader will note that in 1965, the year of the beginning of the Vietnam 
ground involvement, military pay to civilian manufacturing was low by a factor 
of almost one half. 
5 . Ibid., p. 107. 
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The second half of the sixties brought many changes in military com-
pensation, including retirement. Whereas military pay had been increased at 
only infrequent intervals during the 1940's and 1950's, 1963 marked the 
beginning of annual pay increases for career military personnel. New recruits, 
whose pay had been frozen since 1952, began to receive annual pay increases 
staring in 1966. 
The President's Commission in its report traces the origin of marked 
retirement cost increases during this period: 
Much of the attention given to retirement has arisen 
simply because of the sheer magnitude of retired pay costs. In 
fiscal year 1964, retired pay amounted to $1.2 billion; in fis-
cal year 1978 retired pay outlays are estimated at $9.2 billion. 
The fiscal year 1978 figures represents 8% of the defense budget 
compared with 2% in fiscal year 1964. This significant growth 
has occurred primarily as a result of three factors: more retirees, 
higher military pay and inflation. The Congressional Budget Office 
has estimated that~36% of the nondisability retired pay growth 
between fiscal 1966 and fiscal 1976 was attributable to increases 
in the number of retirees, 22% to military pay raises, and 42% to 
CPI increases.6 
What the report did not ~ttempt to cover in this area of pay-raise-to-pension 
cost is more interesting. As was seen in Chapter I, the dynamics of the effects 
of substantial increases in the payroll in a defined benefit plan are destabli-
zing. Even three percent per year pay increases steadily and substantially raise 
costs. Funding to a $84,900 lump-sum benefit with such a salary scale assumption 
translates to a sum needed at retirement of between $325,000 to $600,000 should 
the salary increase become 5% to 7.5% per year. It should not be forgotten that 
the increase in the number of nondisability retirees (from 398,000 in fiscal 
6 
Report of the President's Commission on Military Compensation. Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 25-26. 
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year 1966 to 917,000 in fiscal year 1976) which resulted principally from the 
World War II and Korean War build-up, has passed. Also the extremely large 
military basic pay raises which occurred from 1966-76 to correct the imbalance 
of military to civilian compensation are not likely to be repeated. What is 
left then to cause a near half-trillion dollar payout projected between now 
and fiscal year 2000 in the absence of pension reform is the effect of the 
inflationary wage increase feeding the CPI cost-of-living adjustment after 
retirement.7 
Perhaps the most controversial and substantive compensation increase, 
and the one which most affected the retirement benefit, was the Rivers Amend-
ment passed in 1967. It should be remembered that in 1961 the "comparability" 
pay principle for civilian employees of the federal government had been legis-
lated under the Federal:Salary Reform Act whereby the civil servant was paid 
at a level comparable to private sector wages and salaries. This is important 
in the context of the Rivers Amendment which tied military pay to that of the 
civilian federal employee to be expressed in percentages. The Rivers Amend-
ment, however, dictated that the entire increase be applied as a percentage to 
basic pay. Basic pay, the main cash item, represents only about 75% of RMC 
(Regular Military Compensation) which is the total military pay and which is 
defined as the sum of basic pay, quarters and subsistence allowances and the 
tax advantage related to the tax exempt status of the allowanc·es. 8 However, 
7 The estimate of 470 billion dollars to be disbursed between now and fiscal 
year 2000, referred to at the beginning to Chapter I was predicted in a 5% rate 
of inflation, an extremely optimistic rate under any political or economic 
scenario known to the author at this time. 
8 For excellent description of military compensation in general and illus-
trative examples at all grades and ranks, see 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac. 
Moore and Moore, Inc., Washington, D. C. 
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to keep the percentage increase for R.~C comparable to that for federal civilians, 
every 4% increase in federal civilian pay became a 5% increase in basic pay. 
Since the benefit formula of the retirement plan is applied to basic pay, the 
retirement plan adjustment was unnecessarily high, thus providing an unintended 
windfall. 
In addition to the Rivers Amendment, so-called "catch up" pay raises 
for career military personnel were put into effect during the period of 1967 
to 1969 to keep military pay in line with private sector wages and salaries. 
The chronology of events from the end of World War II to the present time is 
as follows: 
Table 2-3 
Chronology of Major Factors Affecting Defense Manpower Compensation 
1946-48 
1952 
1956 
1958 
1962 
1963 
1965 
1966 
1966 
1966 
1967 
1967-69 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1972 
1975-76 
1976 
20-year military retirements -
Reenlistment bonus 
Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Service 
Proficiency pay program 
Federal Salary Reform Act: Beginning of GS "comparability" 
Beginning of annual pay increases for career military 
Cost-of-living adjustments for federal retired pay 
Beginning of annual pay increases for military recruits 
Variable reenlistment bonus 
Major revisions to CHAMPUS 
''Rivers Amendment11 : Comparable pay increase for military 
"Catch-up" pay raises for career military 
"1% kicker" for adjusting federal retired pay 
Introduction of "automatic" annual federal pay increases 
AVF pay increase for f irst-termers 
Substantial pay increase (BAQ) for career military 
Authorization for enlistment bonus & other AVF-related special pays 
Double pay increase for federal employees (January and October) 
Pay "caps" for federal employees 
Elimination of "1% kicker" 
Source: Richard V. L. Cooper. Military 
Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force. 
Santa Monica, California. The Rand Corp-
oration. 1977, Table 11-2. 
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From the events listed in Table 2-3 the reader can see that increasing manpower 
costs, which have risen from $19 billion in fiscal year 1956 to $59.6 billion 
in fiscal year 1976, were the result of the individual and cumulative effects 
of many different policy decisions implemented since the end of World War II. 
By fiscal year 1977, the rate of pay and retirement had changed 
dramatically. No longer were the lower grades of enlisted personnel earning 
a substandard wage and no longer did a military retiree face a "second career" 
from necessity rather than choice. The President's Commission may have been 
influenced to some extent by this when it stated in Recommendation 7 that no 
Grade 
0-6 Colonel or 
Captain (N) 
0-4 Major or 
Lt. Commander 
0-3 Captain or 
Lieutenant (N) 
E-6 Staff Sgt. or 
CPO (N) 
E-5 Sgt. or 
Petty Officer 
2nd Class (N) 
E-4 Corporal or 
Petty Officer 
3rd Class (N) 
E-3 Private 
1st Class or 
Seaman Recruit 
Table 2-4 
1977 Domestic Duty Pay and Pension 
Total Pay 
and Cash 
Allowances 
$2,574 
(N) 2,040 
1,781 
984 
848 
712 
(N) 622 
Monthly Mo. Pension Mo. Pension 
Basic 20 Years 30 Years 
Pay Service Service 
$2,190 $1,095 $1,886 
1, 715 858 1,287 
1,483 714 1,112 
800 400 601 
680 340 510 
564 282 423 
494 247 371 
Source: 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac. 
Moore & Moore, Inc., Washington, D. C. 
military old age annuities should be paid to former military members while they 
are employed by the federal Civil Service. On balance DoD estimates show that 
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between the years 1964 and 1976 military manpower costs increased approximately 
143% per person. 
From examination and comparison of Tables 2-1 and 2-4 it is a simple 
matter to see what has caused the sharp growth in the cost of military retire-
ment. The benefit formula of 2.5% produced a 50% of pay benefit in 1964 but 
the dollar value was small, ranging from $473 per month for a c~lonel with 20 
years of service to $165 per month for a staff sergeant. However, by 1977 the 
same pensions had become $1,095 and $400 and payable at extremely early ages. 
The percent value cost of an annuity becomes progressively higher as 
its starting age is advanced. For instance, approximately $1,100 is required 
to produce $10 a month starting·at age 65 but $1,900 is required at age 40 which 
is close to the average retirement age for ·enlisted personnel. 9 
Scope and Cost of Present System 
In Chapter I it was briefly noted that the present outlay for military 
retirement is $9.5 billion and if left alone will equal $34 billion by fiscal 
year 2000. These funds are currently disbursed to some 1.1 million military 
retirees. The average age of the fiscal year 1975 retiree was 46 for an officer 
who had served 25 years, and 41 years of age for enlisted personnel who had 
served an average of 22 years. 
The projected cost of the current system can be expressed in either 
of two ways. The first method is in current dollars, i.e., dollars of the year 
in which the figure is cited and increased by the rate of inflation selected. 
9Among the 1.1 million military retirees outstanding today, the average 
enlisted grade at retirement is the E-7; i.e., Air Force master sergeant, Army 
sergeant first class, Navy chief petty officer, and Marine Corps gunnery 
sergeant. The average officer retires at the rank of o~5, i.e., Air Force 
Lt. Col.; Army Lt. Col., Marine Corps Lt. Col., and Navy Commander. 
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It is this method that the taxpayer should insist be used in all government 
studies and projections of future cost increases of any type, the reason being 
that it is in current dollars that taxes are levied. In other word~ governmen-
tal agencies should be required to express their requests for funds for goods 
and services in the same dollars that the taxpayer base of the nation possesses 
with which to meet those requests; and to show projected cost increases in the 
same manner. And, of course, it is this method that shows most clearly the 
effects of inflation. 
Constant dollar projections do the opposite. This is the method 
most often used by DoD, and it masks inflation by subtracting from the increase 
each year the rate of inflation used. Witness, for example, the following 
exchange during the fiscal year 1975 Military Procurement hearings of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. 10 
Senator Byrd. In your prepared remarks, Mr. Secretary, you state 
that the military fiscal year 1975 budget in constant dollars is 
smaller than the fiscal year 1964 budget of a decade ago? 
Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir. 
Senator Byrd. What inflation factor did you take to arrive at that 
conclusion? 
Secretary Schlesinger. I don't have a chart that is handy on that 
Senator, but pay increases between 1964 and 1975 are on the order 
of 178 percent. 
Senator Byrd. But you are speaking in constant dollars. What I am 
getting at is, I assume what you mean is if there had been no infla-
tion, is that what you meant? When you say "constant dollars", 
doesn't that mean eliminating the inflation factor? 
Secretary Schlesinger. Yes, sir. 
10 Since it is inconceivable that Harry Byrd, the financial watchdog of 
the Senate, is ignorant of the use of constant versus current dollars in pro-
jecting increased costs, the reason for this questioning of Schlesinger must 
have represented an attempt to get on the record the explanation of what the 
author believes to be a prime example of sleazy DoD legerdemain. 
Table 2-5 shows past and future military spending under both methods: 
Table 2-5 
Past and Projected Military Retirement Outlays 
for Selected Fiscal Years: In Billions of Dollars 
Current-Year Dollars 
Constant 1978 Dollars 
1964 
1. 2 
2.4 
1978 
9.1 
9.1 
1979 
9.9 
9.4 
1983 
13.8 
10.4 
1985 
15.6 
10.7 
2000 
37.5 
12.4 
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Source: U. S. Congress. Congressional 
Budget Office. The Military Retirement 
System: Option for Change. U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1978. Table 1. p. 7. 
It should be remembered, however, that the U. S. military retirement system is 
an unfunded, pay-as-you-go system. The outlays which have been discussed 
herein reflect only the,actual funds disbursed to retirees. However, they give 
no indication of the liability that the government is incurring for the future 
costs of today's active duty personnel. Sound pension planning in the private 
sector mandates the recognition of such a liability in the form of an accrual 
cost which must be ascertained and paid each year into a trust fund. 
Estimates on such an accrual cost for the military vary. Congressional 
Budget Office estimates are $7 .1 billion for fiscal year 1979. 11 A strong case can 
be made for the implementation of the accrual charge since in so doing the defense 
budget will more accurately reflect its true cost. Under the present accounting 
system the defense function states the retirement costs of former military 
employees who do not contribute to today's defense, but it includes no charges 
for current military employees who are on active duty. 
11 The figures of $7.1 billion plus the outlay currently incurred of $9.1 
billion do not tell the story of the complexity of any of the approved methods 
of pension plan funding. A reasonably basic explanation exists for the more 
serious reader in Congressional Budget Office: Retirement Account Changes: 
Budget and Policy Impacts. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1977. pp. 1-17. 
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Above all, however, accounting changes of this type would increase 
incentives to economize on manpower. Retirement costs are a very important 
part of the total cost of compensation, representing 30% to 45% of military 
basic pay. But if these costs do not appear in the budget it is less likely 
that the true impact can be realized. 
CHAPTER III 
Design Problems and Consequences 
The chief single obstacle to any hope of successful 
pension reform is the present provision which allows a high 
percentage of pay to be immediately distributed upon comple-
tion of twenty years of service. No private plan has met 
anything but waste and disaster with such a plan provision. 
Its need here is bottomed upon the youth and vigor concept --
and promotion flow. 
Let us rid ourselves of the illusion that a young 
and vigorous Army must be comprised of men in their late 
teens and early twenties. Most Americans would be shocked 
to know that the average age of the service arms is twenty 
four . . . On balance, except for a few MOS classifications 
in a very few parts of the world, I believe that the American 
service man or woman can function satisfactorily into their 
mid-fifties. 
From testimony of Shelton Clarke, 
witness, President's Commission on 
Military Compensation, December 21, 
1977, Washington, D. C. 
Clearly the design feature of the immediate payout of an annuity 
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equal to 50% of basic military pay for a twenty-year career has been subjected 
to as much or more criticism than any other by advocates of military pension 
reform. It has resulted, for instance, in an appalling exodus from the ser-
vices at an age far in advance of the end of usefulness to country -- indeed 
as has been noted, the average age of 1975 enlisted personnel was 41 1/2 and 
age 46 for officers. This in turn triggers an annuity payout for a period of 
time almost four times as long as is the case in the private sector where the 
normal retirement age universally is 65. 1 
lsee supra, Table 1-1. Contrasted with the $1 million plus projected pay-
out illustrated would be a payout less than 1/10 as great for a comparably 
salaried civilian plan participant in a 50% of pay defined benefit plan. 
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Besides the monetary or budgetary aspects is the effect on the force 
profile itself from the "twenty and out" feature. Largely because of this 
phenomenon, which re~lects the occurrence of both voluntary and involuntary 
retirements at 20 years of service, DoD has found itself faced with excessive 
manpower replacement costs encouraged if not directly caused by the retire-
ment plan itself. In terms of manpower management and the desired force 
profile, DoD would like: 
(a) Increased retention at 4 to 12 years of service. 
(b) Increased retention at service after 20 years. 
(c) Reduced retention for 12 to 20 years of service. 2 
Table 3-1 
Retention of Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
Numb~rs Remaining out of 1,000 Entrants 
Years of 
Completed 
Service Enlisted 
0 1,000 
5 194 
10 121 
15 97 
20 89 
25 11 
30 3 
Officers 
and 
Officers Enlisted 
1,000 1,000 
411 211 
329 137 
327 115 
318 107 
134 21 
46 6 
Source: U. S. Congress. Congressional 
Budget Office. The Costs of Defense 
Manpower: Issues for 1977. Budget 
Issue Paper. U. S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D. C. p. 77. 
2 
. h. h . f One question w ic cries out or an answer is how even an unfunded pension 
years, can require a contribution of 
end of 20 years only 107 employees out 
is that "20 and out" is costly to an 
plan, non-vested for service less than 20 
up to 45% of covered payroll, when at the 
of 1,000 remain as employees. One answer 
outrageous degree. 
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Within the implications of the inverted pyramid shaped force shown 
above, it may be easily seen that DoD has been unsuccessful in achieving its 
force management goals. 3 One reason could be that without universal mili-
tary training to assure it of an even inflow of personnel, it is forced to 
operate in a market environment, encountering recruitment problems in inverse 
relationship to the economic condition of the nation.4 Thus DoD must always 
plan upon several different assumptions of the economy. It must plan and 
forecast upon data always reflecting (a) high civilian employment; (b) present 
employment; and (c) lower employment. 
The reader will note from Table 3-1 that almost 80% of enlisted 
recruits leave the service by the fifth year. Once an enlisted man has com-
pleted one term (usually 3 or 4 years) and reenlisted for another, the services 
3While the author freely admits that reasonable men may differ on many 
of the observations herein, there can be no difference of opinion in the 
sentence referred to by ·the footnote. Recently Senator Sam Nunn, in his 
Senate Subcommitte~ on Manpower and Personnel hearings of March 2, 1977 on 
the All-Volunteer Armed Force attempted to elicit a consensus from four 
experts on a possible return to the draft. On one point only were the wit-
nesses in agreement, and it was that force management of the service arms 
was poor. 
4The question of the advisability of a return to a fairly administered 
and enforced system of universal military training as an obligation of citi-
zenship is regretably outside the scope of this thesis. It is noteworthy 
that in addition to all the communist bloc states, some 10 member states of 
NATO use the draft, including the Federal Republic of Germany and France. 
See especially the recent report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Achieving America's Goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force? 
95th Cong. 1st Sess. 121 pages. The report was prepared by William R. King, 
Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business, University 
of Pittsburgh. Needless to say, Professor King, as does the author, believes 
that the days of the volunteer army are numbered. 
are unwilling to force that person to leave until he has completed 20 years 
and becomes eligible for a pension. The President's Conunission noted this 
"lock-in" as well: 
.. Second, this "lock-in" constrains personnel 
managers who may be reluctant to separate mandatorily any but 
the very poorest performers and criminals. While specific 
policies differ by service, it is likely that many marginal 
personnel are carried to the 20-year point . . . Both in 
absolute numbers and as a percentage, very few members with 
more than 9 years of service are mandatorily separated. 5 
Forcing a soldier out with less than 20 years, the services would 
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argue, is unfair. At the other end of the spectrum, i.e., the first reenlist-
ment period, there is waste as well. According to the Congressional Budget 
Office, the Services hold down retirement costs consciously by limiting the 
number of personnel peI'11!-itted to reenlist. All of the services are turning 
down some qualified persons who desire to reenlist after four years of service. 6 
This policy sacrifices the multiple benefits of higher first-term reenlistments, 
including a larger number of experienced journeymen personnel, reduced need for 
recruits and lower training and recruiting costs. This costly "tail wagging" 
effect of plan-over-manpower is especially disturbing when studies have sug-
gested that second-term military personnel may be 50% more productive than first-
7 term personnel. 
5Report of the President's Cormnission on Military Compensation. op. cit., 
p. 43. 
6congressional Budget Office. The Costs of Defense Manpower: Issues for 
1977. op. cit., p. 80. 
7Ibid., N. 10, p. 24. 
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Retirement benefits also have a strong effect upon retention later 
in a career. Few personnel leave after 10 to 12 years of service (see Table 
3-1) when DoD desires an increase in service departure. This is partly un-
avoidable and a similar trend at this point is found in private employment 
but also because the "20 and out" point in time is anticipated. 8 Nor, as 
it has been pointed out, do the services tend to force out personnel at this 
point because of lost pension rights. So here again the pension plan is 
whiplashing DoD into undesired and costly manpower management practices. 
Once the 20 year point is reached, a large fraction of the force 
departs. This is the "20 and out" device and the heart of plan abuse. In 
sum, the 20-year benefit and distribution provision under the current system 
gives to the employer, who consists of the taxpayer base of the nation, the 
worst of both worlds. First, there is little retention incentive at the pre-
cise point at which DoD needs to improve retention (i.e., 4 to 12 years of 
service and more than 20); and secondly, substantial retention incentive for 
those whom DoD needs less (i.e., 12 to 20 years of service). 
The President's Commission dealt harshly with the"20 and out" feature. 
It did so by a reconnnendation which would delay the distribution of a life 
annuity payout to a more realistic retirement age. Under the Commission system, 
old-age annuities would begin only at age 55 for 30 or more years of service; 
at age 60 for 20 to 29 years of service; and at age 62 for 10 to 19 years of 
service. However at age 65, the recommended annuities in combination with 
Social Security would still yield a very generous level of income. For example, 
the combination would replace more than 80% of after-tax active duty pay for a 
8 Ibid., p. 81. 
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30-year member and more than 65% of after-tax active duty pay for a 20-year 
member. 
The new pension alignment of military pay plus Social Security would 
look as follows: 
Table 3-2 
Percentage of After-Tax Active Duty Income Replaced by 
After-Tax Military Retired Pay and Social Security at age 65 
Rank Years 
E-6 
0-4 
E-7 
0-5 
E-7 
0-5 
E-8 
0-6 
E-8 
0-6 
of Service Percent 
16 79.5 
16 63.0 
20 78.5 
20 65.8 
22 77.5 
22 68.6 
25 78.0 
25 73.4 
30 85.6 
30 81.7 
Source: Report of the President's Com-
mission on Military Compensation. Table 
4-9. p. 80. 
Richness Level of Benefit Formula 
Coupled with the key defect of the distribution of an immediate annuity 
at 20 years of service of 50% of basic pay is the question of what is an equit-
able benefit, both to the military retiree and to the non-military taxpayer 
whose taxes fund the system. 9 In other words, what does the nation owe its 
military for a reasonable career of faithful and dutiful service? 
9It is, of course, true that military personnel pay federal income taxes 
under the same Internal Revenue Code as is applicable to civilians. However, 
in 1976 some 89 million Americans paid taxes. Subtracting out the military 
who comprise some 2 million and adjusting for level of income etc., the author 
estimates that the civilian taxpayer bears over 98% of the cost of the military 
retirement system. 
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We must examine this eternally complex and classic question because 
in general the United States' military retirement benefit is unique in the 
world among governmental or private sector plans in the critical areas of 
level-of-benefit to pay, and timing of distribution of benefit. In the private 
sector the norm is a pension of 40% to 60% of final average pay when the 
applicable Social Security benefit is added. Less than 3% of private plans 
are inflation proofed for cost-of-living adjustments by a contractual tie to 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) has suggested 
that when the tax structure is fed into the equation one finds that a pension 
equal to one-third of final pay will maintain the standard of living for a 
taxpayer who had been paid $10,000 a year, which is the pay of an E-6 Staff 
Sergeant or Chief Petty Officer (N). 10 A pension of 50% of pay will do the 
same for a married taxpayer paid $20,000, which is the pay of an 0-4 Major 
or Lt. Commander (N). 
A further significant basis of comparison is the 1975 Bankers Trust 
Company study. The corporate pension clients analyzed therein comprise some 
150 companies. The 1975 work compares the various provisions of 271 plans of 
which 75% are conventional and 25% are union. 11 The following table is drawn 
lOAspin has made, and will continue to make in 1979, a very significant 
contribution to the actual modification of military retirement as recommended 
by the President's Commission. He introduced six bills in the 1976 Congress 
to that end. Aspin has a doctorate in economics, has worked as an economics 
analyst in the Defense Department and is a member of the House Armed Services 
Committee. He has championed the enlisted man's pay rights on several recent 
occasions. 
11Bankers Trust Company, 1975 Study of Corporate Pension Plans, New York, 
1975. 
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from the statistical analysis showing median pension benefits as a percentage 
of pay for four different compensation ranges with a separate calculation for 
the Social Security benefit. The career assumption is 30 years: 
Table 3-3 
Pension Benefits of Conventional Private Sector Plans 
Median Plan Benefit 
Career Social 
Final Year's Final Pay Average Total Security 
Compensation Plans Plans Plans Benefit 
$ 9,000 30% 28% 29% 39% 
15,000 33 31 32 25 
25,000 36 35 35 15 
50,000 38 37 38 8 
Note: 5% salary scale used in computations. 
Source: Based on data from Bankers Trust 
Company 1975 Study of Corporate Pension 
Plans. New York. 1975. 
The reader should note that the companies which are reflected in the 
Bankers Trust data are among the nation's largest and most affluent, and possess 
richer plans in level-of-benefits to pay than is the norm. However, the data 
does cover some 8.4 million of the total labor force of approximately 80 million 
persons. 
From Table 3-3 it may be seen that at the $15,000 civilian earnings 
level (representative also of the average-in-force enlisted grade at the time 
of retirement), the combined pension benefit plus Social Security is about 57% 
of pay. Note from Table 3-2 that the President's Commission recommended total 
pension-to-pay percentage at the E-8 (the average enlisted grade at retirement) 
is substantially higher; namely, 85.6%. 
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However, almost none of the plans in the private sector are cost-of-
living indexed. The Bankers survey in general shows that more than 80% of the 
plans analyzed, exclusive of Social Security, yield a pension benefit of less 
than 40% of final pay for a 30-year career. Clearly the benefit level of the 
American military retirement system produces a level of benefits far more than 
the majority of non-military taxpayers can expect to receive. 
It was in this general area of benefit comparability that the President's 
Commission broke most completely with the defenders of the present system within 
the military. Citing the conditions of inequity as perhaps its chief finding-
albeit a philosophical one and expressed however implicityly in the report it 
stated in chapter three, "Military Retirement: Deficiencies of the Current System": 
The military retirement plan received more of the Com-
mission's attention than any other component of military compen-
sation .•. while:.the cost of military retirement represents a 
substantial proportion of all defense expenditures, cost alone 
does not provide a case for change. Rather, the Commission con-
cludes that change is needed because of three inherent dificiencies 
in the existing retirement plan. 
1. The current system is inequitable. Compared to most 
public and private sector systems, it provides significantly more 
generous benefits • • • military retirement provides generous 
benefits relative to private sector plans in a second respect: 
military retirees' pay is completely protected against inflation, 
an unusual and valuable feature. 
The other two deficiencies referred to dealt with the lack of a vesting provision 
for service of less than 20 years, and the inhibiting effect of the plan upon 
force management. It is important that the reader understand the importance 
of the first deficiency especially, since it constitutes the very heart of the 
Commission's findings. The consequence of any pension plan of an excessive 
benefit level is excessive cost, and the only true method of reducing cost is 
to first reduce benefits. 
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Table 1-1 was prepared by the author for the CLU article mentioned 
in the Preface. It is repeated in this thesis to emphasize that it is in-
equitable for an Army Colonel or Navy Captain to receive $1,080,000 in 
retirement benefits in 1977 dollars for an average retirement under reasonable 
assumptions -- and that it is equally inequitable for a Sergeant First Class 
or Navy Chief Petty Officer to receive $446,000 in similar circumstances. 
Because of the admitted need for a vesting schedule which will 
provide severance benefits for service less than 20 years, plus the need for 
an accrual fund for in-service personnel -- any savings to be realized from 
military pension reform will be disappointing. But above all the reader must 
realize that meaningful benefit reductions in the amount of total annuity 
payout will be required to produce any savings at all. 
Social Security Integration 
Another major inequity which exists in military retirement is the 
lack of the inclusion of. the ultimate Social Security benefit in the computa-
tion of the 50% or 75% retirement benefit. Martin Binkin of Brookings formu-
lated a table to show the '~alloon" of benefits from this omission as did the 
author in Table 1-1. 12 From the author's table it may be seen that the 0-6 
Colonel or Navy Captain, at age 65, will have a combined military and Social 
Security benefit equal to 193% of pay; in the case of the Sergeant First 
Class or Navy Chief, 151%. 
In the design and implementation of private pension planning, the 
integration of the applicable· Social Security benefit under appropriate law 
and regulations is almost universally followed. In the Bankers Trust survey 
12 
. k" . 13 Bin in, op. cit., p. . 
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some 87% of conventional plans used some type of Social Security integration. 
The Commission recommended the recognition of the benefit, as has every 
observer of the system familiar to the author. 
The CPI Cost-of-Living Adjustment 
The final, substantive defect in the system which has significant 
consequences in cost is the CPI cost-of-living adjustment used in military 
retirement as well as in the civil service plans in which the civilian 
employees of DoD participate. Under a complex allocation formula, the 
retirement benefits of these retirees are subject to cost-of-living adjust-
ments (strangely the law does not provide for decreases) twice annually should 
h CPI . ff" . 1 13 t e increase su icient y. This affords them a complete shelter from 
the loss of purchasing power during a post retirement period, in the case of 
the 20-year military career, which often lasts 35 years or more. The cost 
consequence of this device is substantial and is the singlemost important 
reason for the half trillion dollar payout mentioned in the motto of Chapter I. 
A reasonable estimate may be made of the dollar value of the inflation-created 
portion of the total payout projected from fiscal year 1975 to fiscal year 
2000, the period of Senator Symington's estimate. The President's Commission 
estimated that without inflation military retirement pay would grow from $9.2 billior 
13rhe reader may secure a clear and concise explanation of the mechanics 
of the CPI adjustment, from the 1977 Uniformed Services Almanac, op. cit., pp. 
43-44. It is here that public pressure upon the politician is in great need. 
Besides being inequitable to the participants of the civilian non-governmental 
labor force who have no comparable protection -- the immunity from inflation 
worry removes from the bureaucrat the personal involvement that he above all 
should have. It is imperative that the federal civil servant and the members 
of Congress whose pension plans are inflation proofed, have the same self 
interest in the fight against inflation as does the non-governmental taxpayer. 
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in fiscal year 1978 to $13.2 billion in fiscal year 2000. Using straight line 
extrapolation from 1978 to 2000 beginning with $9.2 billion and ending with 
$13.2 billion at year 2000, and adding in the cost for 1975 - 1977 of $27 
billion, will yield a total non-inflated payout of approximately $292 billion. 
Since the Symington estimate of payout with a 5% inflation factor was $470 
billion, it may be seen that some $177.8 or $7.11 billion per year of the 
twenty-five year average will be paid due to the cost-of-living CPI adjustment. 
The reader should remain aware that similar projections and results may be 
reached in a projection of the federal civil service plan. 14 In some way we 
must demand no less than this of our politicians and civil servants in the 
fight against inflation, which the author believes to be far more dangerous 
than all the divisions and tanks and missiles of the Soviet Union combined. 
The public servant must be made equally vulnerable to inflation if he is to 
fear it equally with the citizenry. 
It is important for the reader to understand in at least a general 
way how and for whom the Index is compiled and how it operates in changing the 
14 The above calls to mind an anecdote told by Hedrick Smith in his book, 
The Russians. Smith, in conversation with a Russian scientist one evening 
asked: 
"What was the best period in Russian history? 'The best times of our lives, 1 
he replied 'was the War.' 'Because at that time we all felt closer to our 
government than at any other time in our lives. It was not their country then, 
but our country. It was not their war, but~ war. It was our country we 
were defending, our war effort. The war was the one time when the poets were 
writing poetry sincerely.'" (Hedrick Smith, The Russians, The New York Times 
Book Co. New York. 1976. pp.302-303.) 
The anecdote is offered to suggest that while domestic inflation cannot be com-
pared to the Wehrmach of Adolph Hitler, it is no less the enemy -- and an enemy 
which the U. S. politician and civil servant should share with the people as is 
now not the case. 
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benefit level for several million Americans in an inequitable m.anner. 15 First, 
as to how the CPI is compiled. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures average 
changes in prices of goods and services usually bought by urban wage earners 
and clerical workers. It is based on prices of about 400 items which are se-
lected to represent the movement of prices and goods and services purchased by 
wage earners and clerical workers. Prices for these items are obtained in urban 
portions of 39 major statistical areas and 17 smaller cities which were chosen 
to represent all urban places in the United States. They are collected from 
about 18,000 establishments -- grocery and department stores, hospitals, filling 
stations, and other types of stores and service establishments. Prices of food, 
fuels, and a few other items are obtained every month in all 56 locations. 
Prices of most other commodities and services are collected every month in the 
five largest areas and eyery three months in other areas. 
In calculating the Index, price changes for the various items in each 
location are averaged together with weights which represent their importance in 
the spending of all wage ~arners and clerical workers. Local data are then 
combined to obtain a U. S. city average. The Index measures price changes from 
a designated reference date -- 1967 -- which equals 100. An increase of 5% for 
1968, for instance, would change the index to 105. 
The reader will note that the Labor Department has not furnished to 
the Congress a separate index reflecting the buying habits of at least a partial 
sedentary life style which characterizes the retiree. Thus, the CPI used for 
the military as well as for the civil service pension plans will tend to over 
15The writer spent a good part of his testimony before the President's Com-
mission attempting to show Commissioner John Filer that the principle of a per-
centage adjustment versus a flat dollar increase, resulted in excessive increases 
for the high ranking military at the expense of the lower enlisted grades. This 
line of reasoning will be fully developed herein. 
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compensate for that reason. Second, a good part of retirees live not in urban 
areas but in a rural environment, whereas the Index is compil~d mainly from 
urban centers. This is a factor that will further tend to result in over 
compensation. 
However, the main deficiency -- a deficiency so blatant and obvious 
that it cannot have been overlooked by the architects of the Index who are 
themselves its beneficiaries ~ is the percentage principle upon which the 
adjustments are awarded. For example, the following table computes the effect 
of a 7% CPI improvement upon the retirements of three different members of the 
service. 16 
Effect of Annual CPI 
on Military 
Beginning 
Annual 
Rank or Grade Pension 
0-9 General or 
Vice Admiral (N) $29,700 
0-6 Colonel or -
Captain (N) 22,632 
E-7 Sergeant First 
Class or CPO (N) 9,828 
Table 3-4 
Cost-of-Living ImErovement of 7% 
Pension; 30-year Career 
CPI Total CPI Total 
Increase Benefit Increase Benefit 
@ 7% 2nd Yr. @ 7% 3rd Yr. 
$2,079 $31, 779 $2,225 $34,004 
1,584 24,216 1,695 27,606 
687 10,515 736 11,251 
Source: Table 3-4 was constructed by the 
author using current military pay rates. 
It is basic to the principles of sound retirement planning that the 
benefit to be received should not require an unreasonable drop in living stan-
dard on the part of the retiree. In other words, the dollar value of the 
benefit should comprise a reasonable percentage of earnings. It is axiomatic 
16The use of a 7% improvement rate is entirely within reason. For the last 
10 years the military have enjoyed an annual pension increase of more than 8%. 
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in the private sector, for example, for the corporate executive to receive a 
higher benefit than a member of the rank and file. And, of course, this 
philosophy is translated into the military wherein the general receives a 
higher benefit than does the colonel and the colonel more than the sergeant. 
The author finds no fault with that, since pension follows pay. However, and 
most importantly, the principle of cost-of-living adjustments should be 
expressed and allocated not on a percentage basis but on a flat dollar basis. 
Note that the retired Lt. General and his wife presumably leading at least a 
partial sedentary life with children grown and home paid for; with the drives 
of economic acquisition presumably diminished -- receiving a first year allow-
ance for a diminishment of purchasing power of $2,079 which is the pension 
itself of many thousands of non-military retirees who have no such inflationary 
protection. 17 
Was this general's loss of purchasing power $2,079? Almost· assuredly 
not; possibly $500. What is wrong is that he was given a percentage increase 
whereas he should have had a flat dollar allowance for the actual dollar value 
of loss of purchasing power. 
Contrast the adjustment of the general with that of the sergeant and 
his wife. The author does not suggest that the sergeant should have the same 
pension benefit -- certainly not. But the actual loss in purchasing power 
experienced by the sergeant was not dissimilar to that of the general by a 
factor of three. The taxpayer should not be compelled to bear the cost of 
171ess than 1/2 of the labor force have private pension coverage at all. 
Nor does the present CPI reflect the discounts which the military retiree is 
privy to such as Commissary rights, post recreation privileges and free medical 
care. 
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such an absurd and wasteful level of over compensation to a favored few. 
Indices based upon flat dollar cost-of-living adjustments could be con-
structed and maintained by the Department of Labor. 
The attempt, however, to convince the President's Commission of 
this inequity was in vain. The following exchange was between the writer 
and Commissioner John Filer, chief executive of the Aetna Life and Casualty 
Insurance Company. 18 
Mr. Filer. My assumption is your colonel and your sergeant, each 
one's dollar was reduced by 7 percent of purchasing power, however, 
Mr. Clarke. I am suggesting that maybe the percentage -- the per-
centage principle is wrong. The loaf of bread increased 10 cents 
for both the colonel and the sergeant. 
Mr. Filer. You can argue that in terms of base subsistence and the 
ability to get along that one man's retirement is less than another. 
But nevertheless it is a factor that each one's purchasing power was 
reduced by the same percent. 
Mr. Clarke. No. I was simply trying to say, Mr. Filer, that the 
loaf of bread increased 10 cents for the colonel and the sergeant 
alike, yet the colonel was compensated 4 times as much. 
Mr. Filer. Each was reduced by 7%. 
Mr. Clarke. But it was reduced by a percentage and not a flat dol-
lar level which is more equitable. The loaf of bread increased the 
same for the colonel as the sergeant, so why should the compensation 
for the loss of purchasing power be dissimilar? 
Mr. Filer. Because his $8,000 of purchasing power was reduced by 
7% and the other man's $3,000 was reduced by 7%, and the function 
of a pension is not simply to continue to provide an absolute sub-
sistence and no more. At least, I never thought it was. 
18The writer has seen nothing in the several thousand pages of source 
material studied for this thesis to suggest that the CPI should either be 
uncoupled or modified. Dr. Gary Nelson did suggest by letter that the 
Index is not geared to the expenses facing military retirees and indicated 
that large cumulative cost differences over a period of time could result 
therefrom. He stated that he believed the Department of Labor was working 
on other types of cost-of-living indices at the present time. 
Mr. Clarke. You may be right as to the pension but not as to 
the cost-of-living adjustment. What brought this to my atten-
tion Mr. Filer, was a letter to the editor in the New York Times 
of September 18, 1976 in which a military retiree wrote a letter 
which was highlighted. He said, "enough is enough". He said, 
"although benefiting from it myself as a military retiree, I 
have become convinced that it is essentially a giveaway program 
which dispenses too much to those who don't need it and not 
enough to those who do." 
"In my own case I have been glad to get these raises but 
enough is enough, and I don't think the generals really need 
that giant increase while the sergeants have to scramble for 
post-retirement jobs or go on relief." 
And here is what he says that is important. He said that 
as a guess a flat increase of about $20 per month would be 
ample to off set the increased cost of living for that year. 
A flat dollar benefit instead of a percent. Perhaps the letter 
can be printed into the record.19 
The reader has by now seen the scope and magnitude of a giant 
governmental retirement system and the chief design defects which have 
40 
contributed to its excessive benefits and costs. The chapters which follow 
will describe the efforts which have been made to modify it, the military 
response to those efforts and finally a suggested plan which is equitable 
in benefits and reasonable in cost. 
19Needless to say the Commission did not recommend a change in the cost-
of-living provision. The letter to the editor is appended so that the reader 
may read the words of one American who would reduce his consumption at the 
public trough. 
CHAPTER IV 
Current Reform Alternatives 
Old age annuities should begin at age 55 for 30 or 
more years of service, at age 60 for 20 to 29 years of service, 
at age 62 for 10 to 19 years of service. These annuities 
should be similar to those provided civil servants, integrated 
with Social Security benefits and protected from the effects 
of inflation at age 65 the recommended annuities in combination 
with Social Security replace more than 80 percent of after-tax 
active duty pay for a 30-year member, and more than 65 percent 
of after-tax active duty pay for a 20-year member. 
From Introduction to Retirement 
Recommendations. Report of the 
President's Commission on Military 
Compensation. Washington, D. C. 
1978. 
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The complexity.and emotion surrounding change in the military retire-
ment system point up the need to first establish criteria ·before attempting to 
choose between the current system and a revised one. The basic criterion is 
that total military compensation, including retirement, should be only great 
enough to attract and retain the personnel that the Department of Defense re-
quires to carry out its mission. This criterion, because it is designed to at 
least match the sums other employers offer, takes account of the major aspects 
that must be considered in setting pay scales. The criterion requires that 
pay be high enough to allow DoD to compete successfully in a market environment 
for personnel, which is essential under conditions mandated by the all-volunteer 
force. On the other hand, the criterion should insure that costs to the tax-
payer are kept to a minimum. 
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Other criteria may also be useful in choice and design of the system. 
For instance, military personnel must view the system as fair. If not, they 
may leave the military or, if they stay, they may perform less effectively. 1 
It is a balanced reform, rational pension reform meeting those criteria, -that 
must be found if the system is to be modified in an acceptable and stable manner. 
Alternate Reform Measures 
Serious efforts at military pension reform began in 1971 when an 
Interagency Committee (IAC) was appointed by the President with particdpation 
from the Office of Management and Budget, Department of Defense, Department of 
HEW and Civil Service Commission) with a view toward reducing costs. This 
report was forwarded to the President in July 1971. The recommendations of 
the committee are shown in Table 4-2. 
In 1972 the Secretary of Defense, following IAC action, established 
a DoD Retirement Study Group to evaluate the IAC recommendations and to recom-
mend changes to the military nondisability retirement system. This inquiry 
resulted in the Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) which was before the 94th 
Congress as HR 7760. This legislation would have made two major changes. 
First, it provided for an early vesting of benefits. Secondly, pensions were 
to be reduced for 20-year careers. 
lindeed the armed services of Great Britain are now said to be in a crisis 
situation from low military pay and benefits. The British Army is one of the 
worst paid in Europe, five of twelve NATO members pay privates more than 
Britain pays lieutenants. Although having a first rate retirement plan, the 
armed forces are experiencing extremely high rates of voluntary discharges. 
It is, of course, well known in employee counselling that a competitive rate 
of cash pay is an absolute requisite to sound employee relations notwithstand-
ing the adequacy of a retirement program. (See Associated Press Release, 
Richmond Times Dispatch. April 23, 1978.) 
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The third attempt came in the latter part of 1973 when the Defense 
Manpower Commission (DMC) was established by Congressional directive to 
conduct a broad and comprehensive study of overall DoD manpower require-
ments over the next ten years. These findings, along with the Aspin proposals, 
were reported to the President and the Congress in April of last year. Signi-
ficantly it was here that the concept of a 30-point career was introduced 
with a weighting of pension benefits for combat service. The rationale here 
is that the "youth and vigor" concept is important to the combat MOS and yet 
early retirements in the non-combat specialities should be discouraged. 
Additionally, the writer believes that this concept would assist the DoD and 
the nation in solving the grave deficiency in our combat arms. The actual 
shortfall is classified and buried in the legerdemain and ambuguity of DoD 
statisticians. Howeveri many civilian strategists believe it to be critical. 
The DMC proposals would grant a full annuity only after thirty years of 
service. 
Every four years the President by law must initiate a review of 
military compensation. The Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
(QRMC) was formed in January 1975. Areas of inquiry were military salary, 
supplemental benefits and military retirement. 
From a deep belief that the current military compensation system 
is chaotic and essentially a system that promotes early retirements and 
massive waste, Congressman Les Aspin introduced six bills in the 94th Congress 
to revise the military retirement system. His have become known as the Aspin 
Proposals. The heart of his reform goes to the elimination of the "quick 
pension". He would allow for voluntary retirements a full pension only at 
age 55 with 30 years of service; at age 60 with 20 to 29 years of service; 
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and at age 62 with 5 to 19 years of service. For those officers and enlisted 
men who are "forced out," he would provide an instant annuity under the 
benefit formula assuming there are 5 years of service. This annuity would 
be reduced $1.00 for every $2.00 of earned income. Instead of the present 
flat 2.5% of basic pay times years of service formula~ Aspin would substitute 
a graduated benefit formula designed both to provide an equitable benefit for 
a career of service and to assist DoD in its management of manpower and force 
profile. This formula would give 1.25% times a different pay (RMC, which is 
the sum of basic pay, quarters and subsistence and the tax advantage) for 
each of the first 5 years, 1.75% for each of the next 5 years, and 2% for 
each year of service over 10.2 
For a more equitable level of vesting, Aspin would make a participant 
eligible for a benefit after 5 years of service. Finally, Aspin would go to 
the Canadian model for a phase-in member contribution, and a fund to be paid 
by the services to assume actuarial solvency. 
Table 4-1 notes the recommendations of the parties discussed above 
by plan provision, and offers .to the reader a quick source of reference to a 
fiercely complicated subject. 
2Guns and Butter, op. cit., pp. 23-26. 
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A Comparison of Proposed Changes in Military Retirement/Compensation 
Interai.:ency Retirement 
Committee Modernization 
Plan Current (IACI Act(RMAI DMC QRMC Asp in 
P,o\'islon System Proposal Proposal Study Services Proposals 
Service Require- 20YOS 20YOS 20YOS JO. 20, or more Enlisted and offi- Enlisted and offi· 
1
,,,ents for a Pension YOS with 30 re· cers RMC provi· cers after S YOS at 
' Benefit tirement pis. sions supported age 62; or at least 
1 pt. per YOS for 20 YOS, but less 
than 30 YOS at age 
non-combat 60; or at least 30 
I .S pts per YOS YOS at age SS. 
for combat 
Recognize manage-
ment need to force 
indi,·iduals out of 
service before a lull 
career. 
Vesting 
Voluntary Separa- None Enlisted and offi- Enlisted and olfi· (10th YOS) En- RMA provisions Enlisted and offi-
1ion, enlisted cers between 10-19 CCI} between 10-20 listed and officers supported cers-between S-20 
YOS, choice of: YOS, pension at -deferred annuity YOS, pension at 
Deferred annuity at age 60 based on at age 6S (High-3 age 62. 
age 60 (2.5% x YOS x 2.S% of pay average pay x per 
YOSx BPJ (CPI adjusted) pt. retirement 
multiplierx YOS 
or 
completed). 
Lump sum: (S% x 
Note: Reduced de-YOS x BP) at {erred annuity at 
separation 
age 60. 
Involuntary Sepa· None Same Enlisted and offi- Enlisted and offi· RMA Enlisted and offi· 
ration, enlisted cers-between S-20 cers-readjustment cers-immediate 
YOS two options, a pay (mo. terminal retired pay with 5 
mo. benefit at age pay x 24 x per pt. or more YOS. Sec 
60 plus immediate retirement multi- employment re· 
cash payment, or a plier) plus a de- strict ion. 
cash payment !erred annuity at 
double that in first age 6S (reduced de· 
option. Annuity at !erred annuity at 
60 computed on 60) or an additional 
standard formula cash payment = to 
of 2.S% of pay x amt. of readjusted 
YOS(CPI ad· pay. 
justed). Cash pay-
ment in first option 
S"lo of pay x YOS, 
and in second op-
tion IO"lo of pay x 
)fficcr: YOS. Maximum Sl5,000 
separation pay 
lt!inition o! cov- Terminal BP High-3 BP Average High·l BP Average Average o! High-3 High·l BP '"Regular compen-
red earnings years pay x no. o! sation" - based on 
retirement pts. single-salary con-
(following shift to cept. The sum of 
salary system re- BP quarters allow-
figure "lo per retire· ances, subsistence 
mcnt pt. allowances and im-
puted tax advan-
tage ordinarily 
attributed to cur-
rent quarters and 
subsistence allow-
ances. 
lenefit Formula 2.5%/yr. 20 and 2.5%/yr. 20-24 2.5%/yr 20-24 2.66%/ RMA 1.5%/yr. to max. 
•lultiplicrs o,·er YOS YOS; 3%/yr. 25-30 YOS 3%/yr 25-30 retirement pt. of 5 YOS 1.75%/. 
YOS; 2%/yr. 31-35 YOS yr. from 5-10 YOS 
YOS 2% /yr. over 11 
YOS 
Table 4-1 Continued 
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Conimillce !\loderniutlon 
Plan Current (IAC) Act (RMA) DMC QRMC A•pln 
'ro,ision System Proposal Proposal Study Sen ices Proposal• 
':mum Pension 7S% 30YOS 88% JS YOS 78% 30YOS RMA Not addressed 
\1ions and Full payment from Full payment at S5 Full payment with Full payment at RMA Age62S-19 YOS; 
of payment date of retirement with 25 or more 30YOS 30YOS age 60 20-29 YOS; 
YOS Early retirement Early retirement 
age SS '30 or more 
YOS for voluntary 
Early retirement: transition provi- (less than 30 YOS). 
retirements. 
20-24 YOS reduced sion. Reduced Permanent actu-
annuity from retire- annuity at retire- arily reduced 
ment to age 60 at ment ::: to 2.S"lo/ annuity. 
2%/yr. under 60. YOS minus lS"lo. 
25 or more YOS, Increased annuity 
reduced annuity at 30 YOS anniver-
from retirement to sary = to 2.S"lo/ 
S5 at 2%/yr. under YOS 
5S. 
' 
'.iovment Dual Compensa- Same Same Same Monthly retired 
'.ri;tions tion Act (regular pay of anyone in-
·ble Dipping officers only). For- voluntarily retired feit I/, mil. retire- with at least 5 YOS 
ment pay if em- and less than 62; at 
ployed in ci,.il least 20 YOS but 
service less than 30 YOS 
and less than 60 
yrs. o! age; at least 
30 YOS but less 
than SS yrs. of age. 
Will be offset mo. 
by any earned in-
come rec'd == to 1/2 
amt. of such earned 
income. Earned in-
come is defined in 
the IRS code of 
~I 19S4. 
bi Security Full SS retirement At age 6S retired A I age 65, retired Full SS benefits RMA Full SS retirement 
benefits payable pay reduced by pay/annuity re- payable, but should benefits payable at 
50% of SS retire- duced by SO% of be considered when this time. Addi-
ment benefits that portion of SS determining multi- tional considera-
based on service- retirement benefits plier tion probable. 
related earnings based on service-
related earnings. 
(Transition provi-
sion). To prevent 
deferred annuities 
from being wiped 
out by SS gains, 
guarantee a mini-
mum of SO"lo of de-
!erred annuity at 
age 6S. 
' .. 
rucipation Noncontributory Noncontributory Noncontributory Noncontributory Noncontributory Under considera-
tion: a fund devel-
oped by contribu-
tions by the mem-
ber(7% ofsalary) 
matched by the 
federal govern-
ment. 
1LAdjustments Semi-annually Not addressed Same as current Actual inc. in CPI Not Addressed Tied to COL bene-
I Indexed (March & Sept) system fit inc. made in SS 
based on "lo of CPI entitlements. 
inc. in previous 
6mos. 
Source: Excerpted and modified by the writer from a comparison prepared by Ad Hoc Comminee of the United States Flt!<'t Reserve Association. 
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Table 4-2 
Summary of Effects of Changes 
Key Changes & Effects: 
Annuity for 20-Year Retiree (a) 
Benefits for 0-19 Years' Service? 
Member Contribution Required? 
Phase-in for Reduced Annuity 
Lifetime Retirement Pay (b) 
30-Year Retiree 
20-Year Retiree 
10-Year Retiree 
Summary of Effects: 
Overall Evaluation 
Effect on Career Patterns 
Required Changes in Personnel 
Management .Policies 
Costs (constant dollars) 
FY 2000 
Total FY 1979-2000 
Costs in DoD Budget if 
Accounting Procedure Change 
Current System 
50% of basic pay 
No 
No 
$310,000 
190,000 
0 
Features large losses 
after 20 years of ser-
vice, but few losses 
from 10 - 19 years. 
Costs increasing 
through end of this 
century. 
See above 
None 
$46. 8 billion 
$936 billion 
$7 .1 billion 
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RMA Proposal 
Reduced 30% below cur-
rent level for 10 yrs. 
Then restored 
Yes 
No 
20 Years 
$295,000 
155,000 
15,000 
Retains career pattern 
similar to today's, but 
costs less. Low risk. 
Proposed by DoD. 
Continued high losses 
after 20 years likely. 
Retention may be higher 
from 5 - 9 years and 
lower from 10 - 19 
years. 
Few required 
Saves $1.2 billion 
Saves $11 billion 
Saves $1.6 billion 
(a) Percentage reductions ignore high-1 or high-3 averaging, which depends on 
inflation assumptions. 
(b) Total retirement pay for typical enlisted man expressed in today's dollars 
but undiscounted. Assumes retirement at median paygrade for given year of 
service, and average mortality rates. 
IAC Proposal 
Reduced 34-42% below current 
level to age 60. Then 
restored (c) 
Yes 
No 
10 Years 
$265,000 
110,000 
15,000 
Middle-ground option. 
More savings and 
longer careers than 
reduced-to-30 option. 
But no fundamental 
change. 
Similar to reduced-to-
30 except probably 
increase in those staying 
past 20. 
Some to accommodate 
longer careers, but 
no fundamental changes. 
Saves $2.2 billion 
Saves $19 billion 
Saves $2.4 billion 
Table 4-2 Continued 
Annuity at 
·Age 55 to 62 
Option 
Annuity begins at 
age 60. 
Yes 
No 
10 Years 
$210,000 
65,000 
10,000 
Far-reaching change. 
Significantly longer 
careers. Many per-
sonnel management 
changes. High risk. 
High potential 
savings. 
Strong incentive to 
stay 30 years or 
more. Retention may 
be lower from 5 - 19 
years of service, 
though results 
uncertain. 
Fundamental changes 
in all phases of 
personnel manage-
ment. 
Saves $2.8 to $4.5 
billion 
Saves $26 to $36 
billion 
Saves $3.8 billion 
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President's Commission 
on 
Military Compensation 
Annuity begins at age 60. 
Yes 
No 
4 Years 
$281,109 
191, 971 
8,600 
Significant change. Much 
longer careers. Moderate 
risk. Disappointing 
savings. 
Possible incentive to stay 
past 20 years. Large 
deferred compensation fund 
might encourage severance 
from service to get large 
sums of money. 
Some for longer careers. 
Saves nothing until FY 1998 
Added costs over current 
system approximately $1 billion 
N/A 
(c) Range depends on whether retiree is an officer (low end of range) or enlisted 
(high end). 
Source: The basic table is reproduced from 
CBO, The Military Retirement System: Options 
for Change, Table 9, pp. 68-69. The author 
has added the analysis for the President's 
Commission heading and modified several column 
headings. Other modifications were made where 
indicated. The reader may by reference to 
Tables 4-1 & 4-2 quickly summarize the bulk of 
all pertinent potential reform measures. 
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Because substantial reform will almost certainly, in the absence 
of a national or international crisis, occupy the attention of Congress 
during the first half of 1979, the serious reader may appreciate an attempt 
to be provided with a narative, descriptive summary of the philosophy and 
effect of the several major reform efforts marshalled in part by Table 4-1. 3 
The recommendations of the Carter Commission, which consisted of ideas both 
old and new, will be summarized in the concluding portion of this chapter. 
In light of the substantial amount of time and effort which has 
been allocated and is being spent on military pension reform, it is possible 
that most of the components of the new system can be now identified.4 For 
instance, all of the studies, as well as DoD itself, have recommended changes 
in the military retirement system. They do not, however, agree on the amount 
of change. The studies:illustrated in Table 4-1, as well as that of the 
Commission, illustrate a range of change from modest to severe. All of the 
studies have recognized a need for some degree of benefits for ,those who 
retire with less than 20 years of service. The packages differ in the benefit 
multiplier itself and the amount and length of reduction in annuity for service 
of between 20 and 30 years. The studies are roughly divided as to whether or 
not the military benefit should be reduced by all or a part of the Social 
Security benefit. 
3 Shortly after the Report of the Commission was delivered to the Chief 
Executive he stated that he would make his recommendations known to the 
Congress in January of next year. The process, certain to result in an overall 
realignment of benefits downward to some degree, will be both emotional and 
explosive. 
4
one item of reform, almost certainly is the elimination of the quick, 
20-year pension of 50% of pay. Besides being exhorbitant in cost, it robs 
the force manager of a valuable tool in shaping the profile of the service 
arms, a principle fully explained in Chapter III. A second quess would be 
that the Social Security will be integrated into the military benefit in the 
same manner that it is used in the vast majority of private sector plans. 
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A. The Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) Proposal 
This package was introduced in the Congress in 1974, 1975 and 1976. 
Legislative action was never completed. This option would reduce costs, but 
it should result in modest changes in career patterns. It is this option 
which would be most favored by those who believe that the military can best 
accomplish its mission with career patterns similar to those currently in 
force. Hence, for service of less than 30 years, this package would reduce 
annuities by creating a "two-step" annuity. The first step would last until 
the person would have completed 30 years of service, which is a full career. 
During the first step the annuity would be reduce~by about 30 percent. Dur-
ing the second step, the annuity would be restored to close to its level 
under the current system. 5 
This option would also provide def erred benefits for less than 20 
years of service. A person leaving after 10 years of service would receive 
an annuity of 25% of basic pay, but payable at age 60. The system would 
remain noncontributory. In addition, this package would base annuities on 
average pay during the one year of highest pay, would increase the credit for 
retirement for service over 24 years, and would require an offset of the one-
half of Social Security payments attributable to military service. 
Under the current system for a typical enlisted man retiring at 39 
after 20 years of service, an immediate lifetime annuity of $5,800 is granted. 
Under similar facts the RMA annuity during the first-step would be $4,010 for 
10 years, then $5,370 -- then at 65 the military annuity would drop to $4 1 300 
reflecting the Social Security benefit. 
SU. S. Congress. Congressional Budget Office. The Military Retirement 
System: Options for Change. Budget Issue Paper to Fiscal Year 1979. U. S. 
Government Printing Office. 1978. P• 42. 
51 
Finally, it is suggested that under the RMA proposal there would 
be an added incentive to complete a longer service career. On balance, 
however, this option would have relatively modest effects on career patterns.6 
RMA Effect on Costs 
Under the CBO classification of what is termed base-case behavior 
the RMA option would eventually reduce manpower costs. 7 By the year 2000, 
outlays would go down by $1.2 billion a year in 1978 dollars and savings 
would continue to grow significantly in the years beyond 2000. The total 
savings between implementation in 1979 and the year 2000 would equal $11 
billion. Most of the savings would occur because of reductions in annuities 
for those retiring with less than 30 years of service. 
Summary of RMA Option 
This option will save money. The RMA option would probably lead 
~ 
to modest changes in the pattern and length of military careers. Among the 
options under consideration in this chapter, this option would be the least 
consistent with the idea that military careers should be lengthened. It was 
originally drafted by DoD and championed in the Congress by the hawks of 
Vietnam. It has been overtaken by time and the economic forces of inflation. 
6Ibid., p. 43. 
7Base-case turnover assumes that there is no change from voluntary career 
retention that cannot be offset by involuntary severence from the service. 
Under base-case, the only deviation from current behavior is an increase in 
the number of involuntary separations between 10 and 19 years of service in 
the enlisted grades. 
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B. The Interagency Committee (IAC) Proposal 
This option was designed by an interagency committee in 1971. The 
Department of Defense was well represented on the committee. 8 The package 
is a middle ground option in fiscal savings and on career patterns. It 
would call for changes in the force profile. 
Like the RMA option preceding, this one would create a two-step 
annuity except that here the reduction in the first step would be larger 
and last longer. The reductions here would range from 34 to 42 percent below 
current levels versus about 30% under RMA. 9 The reductions under this option 
are designed to reduce military retirement pay during years when the retiree 
is presumed to hold a civilian job.lo Changes would be phased in over 10 
years, and would provide benefits to separations from service with under 20 
years. 
Contrasted with the current system which in the case of a typical 
enlisted man retiring at 39 with 20 years of service would receive an im-
mediate lifetime annuity of $5,800; this option would yield him $3,110 to 
age 60, then $5,360 til 65 at which point the military annuity would fall 
to $4,000 being partially offset by the applicable Social Security benefit. 
8Edward T. Braswell, permanent counsel to the Senate Armed Service 
Conunittee sent the author a copy of the original report in 1974. The 
heavy hand of the career military bias was in every chapter and on every 
page. It was later modified. 
9cBO, The Military Retirement System: Options for Change, op. cit., 
p. 52. 
lOThe percentage of military retirees who seek and hold second career 
employment is very high, approaching 85%. 
IAC Effect on Costs 
Given again base-case career behavior, the initial savings here 
would be similar to RMA, but eventual savings would be larger. By the 
year 2000, costs under this option would diminish by $2.2 billion a year 
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in 1978 dollars. Total savings between 1979 and 2000 would equal approximately 
19 billion dollars. Outlays would, as they will in all the proposals, increase 
in the first few years. 
Summary of IAC Proposal 
This·option is estimated to save about $19 billion between now and 
year 2000. However, the IAC package seems unlikely to result in a drastic 
change in current career patterns, which feature large numbers of retirements 
after 20 years of service. The option would reduce annuities for 20-year 
enlisted retirees. There would also be substantial reductions for officers 
although the IAC plan would permit annuities to continue to grow for those 
who stay past 30 years reaching a maximum of 88% of pay for 35 years of 
service. 
On balance, IAC's larger and longer annuity reduction for 20-year 
careerists combined with higher annuities for those who stay past 30 years 
should reduce the number of 20-year terms and increase the numbers of those 
serving beyond 20 years. It is this option which may approach the largest 
cost savings possible without significant changes in career patterns and 
force profile management. 
c. The Annuity at Age 55 to 62 Package 
This package, which comes most closely to satisfying the desires 
of those who believe that immediate and meaningful pension reform is needed, 
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is a hybrid mix containing elements of the DMC Study and Aspin Proposals 
found in Table 4-1, and strong overtones of certain portions of the recom-
mendations of the 1977 President's Commission. Its characteristics and 
effects are noted in Table 4-2 and comprise the third option for. that table. 
This option is far-reaching and would result in significantly longer mili-
11 tary careers. The eligibility rules for age follow those currently in 
effect for the federal civil service. The completion of 5 to 19 years of 
service begets an annuity beginning at 62; while those completing 20 to 29 
years of servi~e receive an annuity at 60. Those completing 30 years or 
more will receive an annuity at age 55. 
While similar to the federal civil service for eligibility (see 
above) the plan differs from it in two ways. It would be non-contributory, 
and it would provide a cash bonus equal to one year's pay for involuntary 
severance at 20 to 30 years of service. This bonus, as well as the combat 
credit in the DMC option, would be designed to provide the Department of 
Defense with the flexibility to attract and retain those personnel, particu-
larly enlisted combat personnel, who must be separated with less than 30 years 
of service for purposes of youth and vigor. 
The annuity-at-SS proposal would radically change the pattern of 
annuity payout. Rough calculations indicate that for a typical enlisted man 
retiring after 20 years of service, lifetime retirement earnings would equal 
$65,000 as compared with $190,00 under the current system, a cut of 66%. For 
a typical enlisted retiree with 30 years of service, lifetime retirement earn-
ings would go down some 32%. 
llThis is a most important point. The average American would be shocked 
to know that the average age of the entire U. S. Armed Forces is about 24. 
This option, as did the recommendations of the President's Commission, employed 
provisions which if implemented, will mandate substantially longer military 
careers. 
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Force Management Under the Annuity at Age 55 to 62 Option 
The pattern of incentives offered by retirement would be substantially 
different from those in the previous option packages. An entirely different 
career pattern might evolve, reflecting the provision of some benefits after 
only five years. The pull to stay for twenty years might be significantly 
reduced. Whereas the previous retirement options feature a drop in value of 
retirement after 20 years of service, this option would not. The value of 
retirement benefits would continue to grow, in fact would grow most quickly 
as the 30-year service mark was approached. 12· Losses after 20 years of ser-
vice should be much lower, with the typical career lasting for 30 to 35 years. 
Losses from 10 to 20 years of service should occur more evenly (see 
Chapter III for discussion of desired force profile of the service arms). 
Losses from 5 to 9 year~ of service would be uncertain though they could be 
substantially higher. 
Effect on Costs Under the Annuity at 55 to 62 Option 
This option, of course, would result in substantial savings. By the 
year 2000 costs would be reduced by $4.5 billion a year and savings would con-
tinue to grow afterwards as well. Cumulative savings between 1979 and 2000 
would total more than $36 billion in 1978 dollars. Costs would increase for 
several years as they would under all the optional packages. It is likely that 
the more senior force resulting from the implementation of this option would be 
12The serious reader should study the philosophy behind such formulation. 
Pension practioners in the private sector have always counted this type of 
design as desirable and basic and have been puzzled at the inability of DoD 
and Congress to realize that a badly designed pension plan can corrupt desir-
able employee pattern objectives. 
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more productive, resultin& in the author's judgment, in substantial additional 
savings. However, of all the options hitherto discussed, this one would 
present the greatest potential risk to the force manager and to the nation. 
It cannot"be ruled out that this option might not allow DoD to attract and 
retain adequate numbers of personnel. 
It would appear that the Carter Commission weighed heavily the pros 
and cons of this option. The reader will note that when the Commission did 
render its report a new, radical device had been added, namely a deferred 
compensation trust fund to "assist former service members in their transition 
to civilian life and to provide additional incentives to remain on active duty 
through arduous and difficult duties. 1113 On balance, however, it is highly 
likely that the reformed system will have heavy overtones of the Annuity at 
55 to 62 Option. Furth~r, this option, as well as the proposed plan of the 
President's Commission, is perfectly compatible with the Aspin Proposals 
which are not included in Table 4-2 but are described in Table 4-1. 
D. The President's Commission Option 
Of all the options discussed, this, the latest, will perhaps most 
influence the draftsmen of the ultimate, revised system. On June 27, 1977, 
President Carter established the Commission and charged it directly to: 
13 The Connnission may have seriously erred in creating an additional fund 
of such magnitude. It would yield an additional $122,850 at 1% interest, for 
a 25-year career to a typical officer entering the service after 1978. It 
would yield in similar circumstances some $57,610 to the typical enlisted 
person. This fund, however, may not be dismissed out of hand. Some provision 
may have to be made for personnel between the time of retirement and the 
commencement of the annuity payments -- for reasons of equity. 
review at least the analyses, findings and recommendations re-
lated to military compensation which have been completed by the 
Quadrennial Reviews of Military Compensation, the Controller 
General, the Interagency Committee Study of Uniformed Service 
Retirement and Survivor Benefits, the Department of Defense 
Retirement Study Group, and the Defense Manpower Commission. 
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Carter directed that the Commission identify, study and make recommendations 
on critical military compensation issues, specifically addressing the fol-
lowing issues: 
• . • What are the purposes of the military retirement system? 
Is the present system effective in achieving these purposes? 
What changes are appropriate? 
The Commission was composed of eight Commissioners and a chairman, 
Charles J. Zwick, who was a former Rand analyst, a former Director of the 
Budget, and now President of the Southeast Banking Corporation of Miami, 
Florida. 14 The Commission was staffed heavily with in-service personnel 
and former members of the military who have been employed by the government 
in various civilian capacities thus giving rise to the possibility that the 
Commission members, all ~usy men and women, would be staff directed and 
staff run. 15 
14The Commissioners were Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr., Lieutenant General, 
U. S. Air Force (Ret); William E. DePuy, General, U. S. Army (Ret); Thomas 
Enrlich, Presiden4 Legal Services Corporation; John F. Filer, Chairman of 
the Board, Aetna Life and Casualty; Phillip A. Odeen, Vice President, Wilson 
Sporting Goods; Walter H. Page, Chairman of the Board, J.P. Morgan & Co.; 
Jane c. Pfeiffer, Management Consultant; and Herbert F. York, Director, 
Program in Science, Technology, and Public Affairs, University of California, 
San Diego. 
15 rndeed, this extremely heavy military influence caused observers to 
predict that little meaningful would come from its efforts in the way of 
military pension reform. The author believes that these fears were essentially 
incorrect. 
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President's Commission Retirement Recommendations and Their Significance 
As the epigraph of this chapter would suggest, the "20 and out", 
quick pension would be eliminated and the present benefit formula multiplier 
of a straight 2.5% of salary would fall to those of the federal civil service, 
namely: 
Years of Service Per Year Multiplier 
1 to 5 2.00 
6 to 10 2.25 
11 to 35 2.75 
These multipliers are designed as they should be, to encourage service over 
a longer career. If the Commission had stopped at that point the military 
would have a plan roughly comparable to that of their civilian counterparts 
one of the finest in th~ nation, but without the burden of the 7% of pay annual 
personal contribution now borne by the civil servant. 
In addition, the Commission option called for a continuation of 
inflation protection and· a partial Social Security offset. 16 No longer would 
military old-age annuities be paid to former military members while they were 
in the federal Civil Service; and a grandfather cloak would be thrown over the 
shoulders of the present force -- exempting from the retirement rules of the 
Commission those with 4 or more years of service, serving their second enlist-
ment, or serving beyond their initial period of obligated service at the date 
of enactment. 
16The military pension reduction at age 65 would vary from 17% with 20 
years of service to 11% with 30 years of service at rank of 0-5 and 0-6 to 
prevent a full superimposition of the Social Security benefit. 
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The President's Commission Deferred Compensation Trust Fund 
The Commission would create a deferred compensation trust fund for 
each member who completes five years of service. The government's contribu-
tion to the fund for each member would be a decreasing percentage of basic 
pay each year, starting with 20% for years 6 to 10, and dropping to 5% for 
years 26 to 30. Members with 10 or more years of service could withdraw a 
portion of this account while on active duty. 
This trust fund philosophically would serve at least two functions. 
First, it would assist fromer service members in their transition to civilian 
life and secondly, it would provide funds through periodic withdrawal to fund 
the "blackout period" from the day of discharge to the commencement of the old 
age annuity.17 
The amounts to be provided as envisaged by the Commission are sub-
stantial and may be seen below: 
Years 
Table 4-3 
Amount of Deferred Compensation Accrued for an 
Individual Who Enters Active Duty in 1978* 
of Service 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
Officers 
$ 18,320 
48,550 
88,960 
122,850 
140,890 
Enlisted Persons 
$ 8,610 
23,230 
42,400 
57,610 
66,210 
*Figures shown are fiscal year 1978 dollars for an individual who 
enters 1 January 1978 and leaves in the future with the stated years 
of service. Calculations are based on assumed 1.5% real wage growth 
and a 1.0% real interest rate on the fund. 
Source: Report of the President's Commission. 
Table 4-7, p. 69. 
17However, the Commission did offer data which indicate that between 73% and 
89% of all retirees seek and take a second career and that the average officer is 
successful within 3 to 6 months, while the enlisted person requires 2 to 12 months. 
There is a comparative earnings loss in the subsequent career of between 1% to 24% 
for enlisted retirees, and 6% to 38% for officer retirees as against comparably 
aged and educated civilians. 
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In addition to the deferred compensation fund, the current severance 
pay provision, presently limited to officers terminating at 5 - 15 years, would 
be broadened and enlarged to include enlisted personnel: 
Table 4-4 
Comparison of Severance Pay: Commission Plan Vs. Current System 
Years of Officers Enlisted Persons 
Service at Current Commission Current Commission 
Separation System System System(a) System 
5 $12,804 $ 1,431 0 $ 721 
10 15,000 3,475 0 1,643 
15 15,000 8,493 0 4,057 
20 NA 15,325 NA 7,157 
25 NA 24,621 NA 11,598 
30 NA 32,050(b) NA 15,473(b) 
(a) Enlisted reservists with 5 or more years of active duty are 
entitled to severance pay. 
(b) Maximum of 1 year's basic pay. 
Source: Report of the President's 
Commission. Table 4-8. p. 71. 
The net effect of the recommendations of the Commission on military 
retirement is extremely difficult to assess. Without doubt, however, the total 
pension payout for the 20 and 25-year service career has been reduced vis a vis 
18 that of the current system. 
A sharply worded and lengthy dissenting view inserted in the record 
by Lt. Gen. Davis bespeaks of the Report as a proposal that "would cut mili-
tary careerists' lifetime compensation in half", a view that the author holds 
to be gross exaggeration. The Commission Report contains copious tables and 
18 The 20-year career is approximately the average career for enlisted 
personnel while the 25-year career is slightly greater than the average for 
the officer corps. 
illustrations which compare total payout for various grades and ranks for 
different length service careers which make Gen. Davis's charge untenable. 
But there is a diminishment of comparative payout for any length career 
less than 30 to 35 years. 
Perhaps the key chart, which more than any other contained in the 
report would aid the reader in a comparison of total payout, is a present-
value analysis which compares benefits at various years of service. In 
this table the reader will note that the current internal inequity borne 
by short service (less than 20 years) enlisted careers has been replaced 
by incentives to stay on until a full length career has been attained. 
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It was this writer's testimony at the hearings that it is rank 
foolishness to attempt to design a retirement plan which would be meaningful 
to a 18-year old enlisted person. This was done after prior witnesses had 
suggested that even at that age the current retirement plan constituted a 
powerful recruitment tool. Fortunately, the Commission accepted a similar 
view and the proposed plan should have little effect on recruiting or reten-
tion during the initial enlistment period. 
Table 4-5 
Present Value at Termination: Current System and 
Combined Old-Age Retirement and Deferred Compensation 
Value 600 
($000) 
480 
360 
240 
120 
Officer 
. 
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. . . ... 
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. ,_ 
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. . 
.... ····· 
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o+-~~--!1----~~-.-~~~+-~~-.-~~~-r-~~--. 
5 
Value 300 
($000) 
240 
180 
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60 
10 15 20 25 30 35 
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Enlisted 
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.. 
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.. 
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.. ·· ······· =-~····· 
: -··· .. 
. 
• 
. ·· 
• .. 
. . 
. . 
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• • :-Retirement Portion 
. . 
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5 I 0 I 5 20 25 30 35 
Years of Service at Termination 
Assumes discount rate equals inflation rate; this is, 
real discount rate equals 0% 
Source: Report of the President's Corrnnission 
on Military Compensation. Figure 4-9, p. 82. 
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Overall, the pattern of force management and retention rates of 
the Commission proposals should follow that of the previously discussed 
Annuity at 55 to 62 Option as well as that of the Aspin Proposals. Tiie 
distinguishing feature of the Commission plan is the extremely substantial-
in-amount deferred compensation fund provided to compensate for the military 
"X" factor. 
Cost Effect of the President's Commission Option 
It is in the extremely disappointing monetary area that the Commission 
option might be most vulnerable, for although it purports to cut total pension 
payout substantially it offers little savings over the current plan until the 
turn of the century. Tiie reasons are both obvious and hidden. 
The Commission plan, as do all the option packages, calls for the 
earning of meaningful benefits during the first 20 years. Tiiis in itself is 
a quite consequential and substantive expense and is probably the singlemost 
. h . d d d" 19 prominent reason t at monetary savings are mo est an istant. However, it 
is entirely possible that the administration will request that the military 
retirement plan be put on a funded basis as are the plans of the private sector. 20 
19nata indicate that projecting costs as they are now carried, i.e., on 
a pay-as-you-go basis unfunded, the proposed President's Commission plan would 
add $60 million in cost in 1983, increasing to $700 billion extra by 1989 
which is the high-water year -- then producing a net savings in 1998 of $300 
million going to an annual net savings of $4.4 billion in the year 2019. 
20see Congressional Budget Office. Retirement Accounting Changes. op. cit. 
Since the first year accrual change would add $7 billion to the budget, the 
political feasibility of such a move is not unimportant. 
Here there is a charge for retiree's annuities but in addition there is an 
interest bearing fund to which payments must be made annually which, on an 
actuarial basis of soundness, must be capable of reasonably amortizing the 
costs of the in-service force. At the present time this unfunded liability 
stands at $268 billion. 
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Should the nation transition to a funded plan, however, the 
President's Commission proposals would become more fiscally attractive, 
relative to the accrual amount which would have to be added under the current 
plan. In such circumstances the President's Commission Plan would require 
a contribution of approximately 28.5% of basic pay for each member of the 
system while the current system would require 36.7%. 
The reader will note that the path leading to a revised military 
pension system has been long and varied. Serious efforts were begun almost 
seven years ago. There is, however, a direct precedent for such a time 
span in the legislative history of private pension reform. Efforts to 
effect reform among those plans were begun in 1962 with the creation of a 
blue ribbon commission by President Kennedy and final action was not taken 
until Labor Day of 1974 when Gerald Ford signed into the law the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act. In the next chapter many of the factors 
which have contributed to the delay in military pension reform will be dis-
cussed and developed. 
CHAPTER V 
Military Response to Reform Proposals 
The Air Force and other military services are unique 
callings. The demands we place on our military men and women 
are unlike those of any other country. Our worldwide interests 
and commitments place heavy burdens and responsibilities on 
their shoulders. They must be prepared to live anywhere, fight 
anywhere and maintain high morale and combat efficiency under 
frequently adverse and uncomfortable conditions. They are 
asked to undergo frequent exposure to risk, long hours, periodic 
relocation and family separation. They accept abridgement of 
freedom of speech, political and organizational activity, and 
control over living and working conditions. These are all part 
of the very personal price our military people pay. 
Statement of John Stetson, Secretary 
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of the Air Force before the President's 
Commission on Military Compensation. 
Washington, D. C. January 19, 1978. 
It is doubtful that a more eloquent description of the military 
"X" factor has ever been delivered than the one which is reproduced above, 
and iL is mainly this "X" factor upon which the members of our armed forces 
-rely as the principle rationale for a continuation of the status quo in the 
issue of pension reform. The "X" factor, as applied to the military and as 
it is perceived by service personnel and members of their families, is that 
particular inconvenience and added degree of personal sacrifice and physical 
risk which is experienced and which sets them apart from the general population. 
It varies greatly both among the services as well as the MOS classifications 
among the personnel. 
For the vast majority of the men and women of today's service arms 
this factor does not contain meaningful added physical risk or danger since 
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the overwhelming percentage of today's forces are non-combatant. 1 Combat-to-
support ratios for the active Army stood at approximately 25% of total 
strength in 1971. 
In 1975 the Army, in an effort to reverse this trend, reclassified 
manpower from support-and-headquarters to combat classification. Units from 
the National Guard and Reserves have been factored into the active force to 
where at the present time if the nation became engaged in a major conflict, 
58% of its field artillery will come from these reserve components. Likewise 
65% of the Army's combat engineer battalions, 52% of its infantry and armor 
battalions and 45% of its aviation forces as well as 65% of all Army tactical 
support would be from the irregular forces. It is estimated that of the 
220,000 Army ground personnel now assigned to NATO and stationed in Europe, 
less than 64,000 are corllbat troops. 2 
These statistics are not intended to demean those men and women in 
our armed forces to whom patriotism has some degree of meaning. The VA hospitals 
and the military graves of the nation bear heartbreaking testimony to the fact 
that honor, duty and country.does exist in the service arms. But the American 
military press and the servicemen's lobby groups which strive so mightily for 
1Perhaps in no other war in our history was the "X" factor among the soldier 
and sailor more unevenly distributed than in Vietnam. The author will never for-
get an attempt to console two friends, parents of a slain Navy medic in 1970. 
"It was so unfair," said the mother bitterly. "Our son joined the Navy. He 
wasn't supposed to be in danger but when he got to Vietnam, he was attached to 
the Marines". Of the 525,000 troops in-country at the height of the war -- less 
than 25,000 were in the field in a combat capacity. For the vast number of the 
American forces, their tour in Vietnam was less dangerous than the crossing of a 
busy New York City street. 
2narold J. Logan, "Guard, Reserve at a Curious Crossroads." The Washington 
Post. June 27, 1977. p. A-2. 
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the destruction of any attempt at pension reform should not be permitted to 
have it both ways. They may not, for example, plead the case for the con-
tinuation of a lavish pension plan on the grounds that to be in the military 
is to be in jeopardy of life and limb when there is ample data to show that 
in our wars, the one-tour citizen soldier has always borne the brunt of battle 
mortality. However, because the "X" factor syndrome is the rationale most 
ardently advanced and defended, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze and 
develop its composition and applicability. 
The following examples should be of value to the reader. At the 
close of World War II and the subsequent demobilization of the armed forces 
of the Unites States there grew, in the context of the cold war which followed, 
a fear that we had dissolved at too rapid a rate our forces in being relative 
to those of the Soviet Union. Out of this fear there was fashioned an incredibly 
disciplined deterrence system -- indeed for 15 years our only credible deterent 
was the Strategic Air Command. From the level of discipline and selfless dedi-
cation imposed upon and accepted by both the air crews, who suffered appalling 
divorce rates, and the ground crews, who displayed no less a degree of fanaticism, 
a fearsome "X" factor evolved and was sustained without the justification of war 
as a causation factor.3 
Consider, on the other hand, the example of an Air Force major engaged 
in computer technology. Having entered the service in 1950 and serving a 25-year 
career during which he rose from the rank of lieutenant -- this officer served 
3In the annals of American peace time military history the dedication of 
the men of SAC remains unique. It was not until the December bombing of Hanoi 
during Linebacker II in 1972 that the matchless record of excellence was ended 
when several B-52 crew members declined to fly. 
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through two wars, Korea and Vietnam totally untouched by either. During his 
career he, his wife and their children tasted and participated in the cultures 
of two foreign host states. Never was this officer or any of his family in 
physical danger. Where was his "X" factor? First, his wife was never happy 
with or could she become reconciled to the periodic uprooting of her home and 
loss of friends. Her children were forced to change school frequently. She 
lived in a subculture totally comprised of the military. Consequently, she 
was never supportive of the career of her husband. Was there an "X" factor 
present here deserving of special pension treatment or is the situatiort described 
presently being experienced by a good part of the labor force? 
Or, lastly, consider the example of four young citizen-
soldier Marine officer candidates enrolled in the Basic Course at 
Quantico, Virginia in 1967. They had volunteered for the Marine 
Corps, three to fly and one to be an infantry platoon leader. 
For 6 months they suffered the rigorous, physical demands, social 
deprivations and isolation which at that time characterized the 
free world's most demanding combat training course. On the day 
before graduation one of the four went before a special board of 
officers and declined his collllllission. The other three were grad-
uated as commissioned officers; two went on to Pensacola, Florida 
for flight training.while the other stayed on at Quantico for 
advanced infantry training. 
The first, who had declined his commission went to 
Vietnam with a rifleman's MOS. During the aftermath of Tet 1968 
he was killed while leading a night patrol in Quang Nam province. 
The two pilots, former college roommates, remained 
together flying most of a tour in 1969. One returned safely. The 
other, while incoming from his last mission, a medivac rescue 
flight, was shot down in flames and killed as he neared DaNang. 
The fourth was attached to the 3rd Marine Division on 
the DMZ. In 1971 he suffered a severe head wound in hand-to-hand 
combat with North Vietnamese regulars and was returned home.4 
4These young men were once dear to the author and his wife, who was the 
mother of one and the "foster mother" for a year of the other three. Their 
loss is but one example among countless others of the senseless waste of war 
and the culpability of old men who throughout history have sent young men to 
die in them. Suffice to say, the First and Second Indochina wars, at a cost 
of 3 million human beings and more than $1 trillion in treasure, decided noth-
ing. The decolonization of Indochina was merely delayed for a few seconds of 
history. 
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Thus, for two of the four the 11X11 factor was of the highest magni-
tude and for the other two it was total. What is suggested here is simply 
that within the rank and file of the military there is a great dissimilarity 
of burden and risk. The reader must confront the question for himself for 
it is only within the principle of excessive risk and deprivation that a case 
can be made for the justification of surplus benefits in the military retire-
ment system. Congressman Les Aspin covers this critical issue more succiently: 
It is popular to attribute the level of military pension 
to the "X" factor, otherwise described as the rigors of military 
life such as long hours, risk of life and limb, assignments away 
from one's family. Military life is certainly not the same as 
civilian life. Therefore, there is no reason why military pay, 
pensions and perquisites should be identical with the civilian 
world • • . Some argue that the extra benefit is warranted by 
the risk of life and limb inherent in a military career. Of 
course, most of the men who see combat are one-tour soldiers who 
never put in enough time to qualify for a military pension. As 
for the careerists,:most Marines have certainly seen combat, but 
how many Navy men, apart from aviators have? Lobbing shells at 
Korea or Vietnam from a floating steel platform several miles off-
shore doesn't fall into the same category as the G-I chin deep in 
mud with bullets whizzing overhead.5 
Aspin further notes that if the added risk is deserving of extra com-
pensation perhaps that degree of extra risk can be identified and tied directly 
to extra retirement credits. The Defense Manpower Commission Plan (Table 4-1) 
briefly analyzed in Chapter III suggested, for example, that for pension pur-
poses a career should be comprised of 30 points for 30 years of service and 
that for each year in a combat status the participant would be awarded 1.5 
points. Thus, a combat soldier could be eligible for a unreduced benefit after 
20 years of service. The author strongly endorses a principle of this type and 
will argue on its behalf in the concluding chapter. 
5Aspin, Guns or Pension. op. cit., p. 11. 
Other elements of the military factor upon which Aspin comments 
are those of frequent station changes, and separation from family. As to 
the former, many civilian jobs require frequent transfers and, of course, 
many families find the opportunity to live in a variety of countries one 
of the attractions of the military. Unless the writer is mistaken, the 
verse "Join the Navy and see the World" antedates World War II. 
The sacrifice of separation from family, however, is another 
matter and represents an area where there is relatively little comparison 
with private sector employment. But again Aspin states that even here, 
within the military itself, there is a great deal of variation. 
The Air Force reports that it has 22,000 plus assign-
ments scattered about the world that are labeled unaccompanied. 
This means that about 3.5% of the men and women in the Air Force 
are in assignments away from their families. The Navy is dif-
ferent -- any shipboard assignment involves family separation. 
The Navy concludes that the average male enlisted man 
will spend 32.4 percent of his career away from his family due 
to sea duty • • • Monetary payments could be made for family 
separations, but with such variation it makes no sense to increase 
pensions for everyone because some suffer extended separations. 
Aspin concludes, on balance, "the military is a connnunity of more 
than 2 million persons. As in any society there are more onerous and less 
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onerous jobs, more desirable and less desirable assignments. To consider that 
there is a specific "X" factor is to lump military lawyers in with a ship's 
boiler room men. We can no more stereotype the military than we can the pop-
ulation of Oregon, which is virtually the same size as our military population. 116 
6For an eloquent and enthusiastic advancement of these views, see rebuttal 
to this writers CLU article by Col. Minter L. Wilson, Jr., representing the 
Retired Officers Association. CLU Journal, Bryn Mawr, Penn., January 1978, 
pp. 72-74. 
Subsidiary Responses 
Subservient to the issue of the military "X" factor are a series 
of subsidiary responses advanced by the military. Five will be briefly 
addressed and developed. 
Costs as Percent of National Indices 
One such issue is the allegation that the pension system is .esca-
lating in cost at a rate little or no different from that in the private 
sector and that its costs are projected to level off when taken as a per-
centage of the.defense budget or the GNP. It is further suggested that the 
inclusion of the cost-of-living adjustment projections, which point to the 
half trillion dollar payout by the year 2000, that when that year has been 
reached the cost of all products, goods and services will have inflated in 
a like manner and at the same rate. 
The Deferred Compensation Theory 
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Because of the historically low cash pay of the military, more 
perceived than actual except at the lowest enlisted grades, there is also 
firmly embedded in the military mind the notion that the retirement plan 
consists of a method of deferred compensation and not a pension plan per se. 
As deferred compensation, whatever degree of over generosity may be present 
is justifiable to make up for the lack of comparability in military pay to 
civilian pay. 
This conviction is most keenly felt among retirees of the fifties 
to middle sixties whose pensions in spite of CPI adjustments as applied dur-
ing those years are relatively small in amount. This theory was forcefully 
brought home to the author when an angry letter was received in response to 
the CLU article mentioned previously, and written by a pilot who had served 
in three wars. 7 This position is not without merit. As was stated in 
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Chapters I and II the compensation plan of our military has been a historical 
disaster inasmuch as its personnel have never known what they actually earned. 
Their compensation package consists even at present of some thirty odd items. 
It has been badly communicated and explained to them and it is little wonder 
that surveys have reflected both confusion and low perception levels. 8 The 
blame for this lack of comprehension should be laid squarely on the doorstep 
of the DoD force managers at all levels. 
The Recomputation Grievance 
A third rationale from the military has to do with recomputation 
which is a sensitive issue and is closely tied to the grievance discussed 
above. It is also identified in the loose classification of the perceived 
"erosion of benefits" which is now prevelent in the military philosophy. 
The roots of recomputation lie in the manner in which retired pay has been 
adjusted during the post retirement period. This grievance is held by 
retirees of the pre-1958 period. 
Prior to 1958 the retirement benefits to military retirees were 
increased by a direct tie-on with the pay increases given to active duty 
personnel. This practice was halted in 1958. Not until 1963 was legislation 
passed which did permit one final recomputation and then substituted the CPI 
as the pension adjustment indicator for years subsequent to 1958. The per-
ceived inequity lies in the fact that had the old system continued the pension 
7see Exhibit I in the Appendix. (i.e. letter of Major Jack B. Stowers.) 
The forcefulness of Stower's remarks leaves little doubt that he perceived his 
retirement plan as a contractual, albeit implied, obligation of deferred com-
pensation, the manipulation of which would constitute a breach of faith. 
Bsee Cooper. op. cit., p. 366. 
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would be substantially higher than in the case under the new system because 
since 1958 retired pay has grown by 230% whereas active duty pay has grown 
by 430%. 9 
Erosion of Benefits 
An important but surely unjustified military response is that of an 
"erosion of benefits". This is a general and vague allegation. It consists 
of the erroneous view that there is currently in being an ongoing erosion of 
military benefits and that present attempts to modify the retirement system are 
simply a continuation of that process. 
The origin of this total misconception is both insidious and myster-
ious. It may have arisen as a deliberate propaganda campaign by the organized 
military lobby groups to mitigate certain pension reform. There are some 22 
different military lobby groups, associations, committees, print organs, etc. 
who actively strive to maintain the status quo. They are powerful and vocal. 
The role of the three service newspapers, is instructive. Congressman Aspin 
assigns a high level of effectiveness to them, saying: 
The Navy, and Army, and Air Force Times, are private pub-
lications which have won a large readership precisely because they 
look after the interests of servicemen and defend every financial 
redoubt. The principal officers of the various organizations are 
elected and must respond to the main demands of their activists, 
which is the preservation and enhancement of benefits. 10 
Professor John B. Keeley, former career Army officer, West Point 
educator, and now professor at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the 
9See Exhibit II in the Appendix in which a retired major expresses the 
grievance of recomputation. 
lOGuns or Pension. op. cit., p. 18. 
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University of Virginia adds, "the nation's soldiers are angry and defensive 
over attempts to reduce benefits and increase efficiency. Military employees 
are retirees are organizing because their traditional defenders appear to have 
deserted them. 1111 Professor Keeley noted that when medical benefits for 
retirees were curtailed at Fort Lee near Petersburg, Virginia in March 1977, 
"Army retirees organized a political campaign that took them all the way to 
Washington to protest the cuts. They organized and they won." Keeley later 
testified before the President's Commission. Included in his testimony was 
a reference to the Association of Air Force Sergeants, an organization which 
when founded in 1970 contained 7,000 members. The Association now has 100,000 
members and has its own full-time lobbist and offices in Washington. Keeley 
asserted that the military today has a siege mentality: 
The tra~ of withdrawal from the eventual fall of Vietnam, 
coupled with the pardon of draft evaders, the upgrading of undesir-
able discharges and the vocal and strident attacks on military pay 
and benefits have left a bitterness that is deeper and more serious 
than is generally appreciated. We need reform, but we also need flex-
ibility. We can't lose sight of what the military is for.1 2 
llquoted in Allen Short, "Military Morale Said to be Plunnneting," Richmond 
Times Dispatch, Oct. 16, 1977, Sec. C, p. 10. 
12Ibid. It should not be surprising to the reader to learn that the mis-
calculation of Vietnam occupies such a position of prominence as a principal 
cause of the deterioration of the Army. It is entirely possible that our Army, 
as these words are written, has so declined in quality as a fighting force that 
it can no longer be counted upon to help implement the foreign policy of the 
chief executive. 
It is the author's conviction, based upon the study of voluminous written 
material, discourses with combat returnees, and with two of the principal civilian 
policymakers of our nation during the era, that for a period of time spanning 
the entire war including events leading to the fall of Saigon itself, the high 
military consistently and consciously misled three successive heads of govern-
ment as to both the nature of the war and the capabilities of the enemy. These 
men now occupy the highest positions in the three services. Throughout the 
entire war only three highly placed men, two military and one civilian, placed 
their personal honor and their country over their professional careers to the 
extent that they resigned and attempted to effect a withdrawal from a hopeless 
cause. In 1968 Lt. Col. William Corson, Marine combat soldier-scholar, resigned 
from the Corps to write the first great book of the war, The Betrayal. In 1973 
the Army's most highly decorated combat soldier, Col. David Hackworth, resigned 
brokenhearted over the fruitless loss of young American citizen soldiers he had 
led. Daniel Ellsberg, who saw much combat as an advisor in the pacification 
program during the formative years of the war, is the third. 
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Retirement Costs Stable as Percent of Budget 
It is especially distasteful to see the repeated use of irrelevant 
and false data and legerdemain by military spokesmen in their efforts to 
defend present pension costs and project military costs in general. A favorite 
device is the comparison of the subject item, as a percentage of one of the 
several natural indices, with the use of constant dollars tied to a year far 
in the past. The exchange mentioned earlier in Chapter II between Senator 
Harry Byrd, Jr. and the then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger is, again, 
highly illustr~tive. In contrasting in constant collars the cost of his mili-
tary budget to a ten-year prior current dollar cost, Schlesinger was guilty 
at the very least of a breach of professional honesty. We must learn to insist 
that the politician include the monetary effects of inflation upon the cost of 
his project.when he comes to the market place for money. In the Byrd-
Schlesinger exchange it was utterly irrelevant that the 1975 DoD budget was 
relatively low in constant dollars. What was relevant was the fact that his 
source of funds was and still is the federal income tax which is itself computed 
on the current income of 80,000,000 odd taxpayers -- and in which inflation 
itself pushes the taxpayer into an ever increasing tax rate. 
Similarly the military and almost invariably the DoD analyst, in 
attempting to mask the runaway cost of the military retirement system, of ten 
alleges that "in constant dollars the system will not increase as a percent of 
the budget to fiscal year 2000," or whatever. Factually, nothing is further 
from the truth. The future costs of the United States military retirement 
system, if nothing is done, will escalate over the foreseeable future as will 
manpower costs itself. Total manpower costs of DoD, including inflation and 
increased retirement costs are projected to sharply increase. 
Table 5-1 
Defense Manpower Costs 
Fiscal Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Billions 
55.8 
60.9 
66.0 
70.9 
75.9 
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Source: CBO. Defense Manpower Commission, 
Compensation Issues for Fiscal 1977. 
Background Paper No. 6, April 2, 1976, 
Table 11, p. 37. 
Thus it may be seen that without the projected addition of the accrual fund it-
self which adds $7 billion to the 1979 defense budget, there will potentially 
be a 36% increase in defense manpower costs over the next four years. 
Within the line and staff items which comprise manpower costs, the 
retirement plan costs will worsen both in terms of constant and current dol-
lar projections. Cooper indicates that the source of the past 20-year increase, 
1956-1977, of $477 million to mroe than $8 billion, is twofold. 12 First, the 
number of retirees has grown by more than 500% during these 20 years, while 
the average cost per retiree has almost doubled; and secondly, the cost of 
military retirement has increased from about 1% of the DoD budget to about 7% 
and from approximately 4% of manpower costs to 17%. Moreover, Cooper adds, 
the problem will worsen. Assuming that the defense budget remains level in 
1978 dollars,. retirement costs are projected under current policy to grow to 
more than 12% of the DoD budget by the mid 1990's. 
12 Cooper, op. cit., p. 372. 
Actual: 
Current dollars 
Projections: 
1978 constant dollars 
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Table 5-2 
Military Retirement Costs 
Fiscal 
Year 
1956 
1960 
1964 
1968 
1972 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
Retirees Cost Percent of 
(OOOs) ($ billion) DoD Budget 
183 $ 0.48 1.3 
243 0.69 1. 7 
411 1. 21 2.4 
624 2.10 2.7 
867 3.39 5.2 
1,108 7.30 8.3 
1,180 9.04 8.3 
1,196 9.83 9.0 
1,256 11.21 10.2 
1,280 12.71 11.6 
1,250 13.58 12.4 
Source: Richard V. L. Cooper, op. cit. 
Table 15-4, p. 375. 
Thus, the reader may clearly see that the allegation by the military 
of a "leveling-off" in the cost of retirement is without foundation. This is 
in spite of the fact that as the year 2000 approaches, the abnormally large 
number of retirees from World War II and Korea will leave the rolls. Military 
retirement is inordinately expensive -- not because its costs are high per se, 
but because its benefits are excessive and both out of line with those of the 
private sector as well with long adherred to principles of sound employee bene-
fi 1 . 13 t p anning. 
We owe the military an adequate and reasonable level of retirement 
and, as the reader will note in the concluding chapter, a better-than-average 
plan for certain segments of the military. But we do not owe all members of 
13The author is in basic agreement with Professor William King's argument 
in Achieving America's Goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force. 
Dr. King is pessimistic over the chances for the survival of the AVF 
itself. King believes that all estimates of increased manpower costs are low 
and that only through significantly higher costs will the AVF be sustained into 
the 1980's. 
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our military establishment of 2 million persons, 85% non-combatant, a lavish 
plan with costs as a percent of pay more than 7 times that of the private 
sector. It is in this spirit and context that the subject matter for the 
concluding chapter will be approached; namely, how should a just and equitable 
retirement for the American military be structured? 
CHAPTER VI 
Toward Rational Pension Reform 
Now I would like to consider that most important aspect 
of the AVF, its effectiveness. Although I have made no attempt 
at assessing the military effectiveness of the Armed Forces in 
either an absolute or relative sense, I do consider a number of 
aspects of the current All-Volunteer Force to be indicative of 
potential-effectiveness deficiencies. 
Among these are: the high adverse attrition rates, 
which cannot but negatively affect morale, and hence effective-
ness; high rates for nonjudicial punishments, which have increased 
35 percent since Vietnam era levels; survey results show that 25 
to 30 percent of active enlisted personnel would try to avoid or 
probably refuse to serve in combat situations, depending on the 
nature of the emergency; the decreased quantity and quality of 
the reserves, which serve to amplify the peace time only view 
of our military forces. 
Statement of Professor William King 
before Senate Subcommittee on Man-
power and Personnel, Hearings on 
the All-Volunteer Armed Force, 
March 2, 1977. 
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In general, it is of great value for the pension planner to know what 
is the norm and what is the exception with regard to plan design. This does 
not lead to mediocre or sterile plan design, but does offer to the drafts-
man the suggestion that to part from the proven way is to tread carefully. 
Further, from experience one may know that once a serious design defect is in 
operation in a plan, it is a delicate and frequently difficult task to rid the 
plan of that defect. This is true because the plan participants tend to look 
with suspicion upon any amendment that is drafted which will affect them as 
80 
plan participants and beneficiaries. It is largely for these reasons that 
"grandfather" or transition provisions almost always accompany a plan modi-
fication. In Table 4-2 it may be seen, for example, that the "phase-in" 
period ranges from four years for the President's Commission to twenty years 
for the RMA proposals. 
In pension planning it is generally known that the richness level 
of the benefit formula should provide, at the conclusion of a realistic 
career of employment, a retirement benefit which when added to the applicable 
Social Security old age pension, is around 40 - 60% of pay as it stood just 
prior to retirement, or upon some averaged period of the highest income years. 
In the private sector there is a duality of obligation, delicately balanced. 
First, an equitable benefit should be paid to the lorig service, faithful and 
loyal employee. Second; there is an obligation to the stockholders who have 
contributed the capital for the formation of the company - employer that the 
contribution (cost) level required to keep the plan actuarially sound should 
be reasonable and in line with comparable levels of pension costs existing 
elsewhere. This level in the private sector would comprise as a percentage of 
covered payroll something in the range of 8% to 15%. 
Just as we have been concerned throughout this paper with the effect 
of a retirement plan on force profile and force management -- terms used by DoD 
force planners -- in the private sector there is equal concern over the effect 
the plan will have upon the reduction of costly turnover. Most of the time in 
the private sector the employer desires his plan to assist him in the stabiliza-
tion of the employment patte~n. 1 In Japan, turnover of employment is practically 
!This is the objective in the majority of private plans. However, the 
author is presently designing a profit sharing plan for a large beverage dis-
tributorship with provisions and benefits which will result hopefully in large 
voluntary severances of employment at around age 50. Past that point the phy-
sical demands upon the route salesman tend to be excessive. 
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unknown among employees in the industrial corporations, contributing to both 
a very low per unit cost of production and a powerful competitive position 
in the international marketplace. 
In private sector planning, two basic principles are well-known and 
adhered to. First, it is known that if the benefit formula provides benefits 
which are high enough to support the participant at ages prior to age 65, 
there will be pressure to retire early. 2 Secondly, if the vesting schedule 
contains an immediate distribution provision when the vested percentage reaches 
100% there will be an exodus from employment at that point with little regard 
to age. The pension planner should, therefore, tread his way carefully 
through the maze of desired benefits balanced against the limits of the bud-
geted cost. 
The reformatidn of the United States military pension system would 
be child's play to any experienced pension technician if the political factor 
were removed. The simple adherence to the several basic principles enunciated 
above would lead to a reasonable and rational plan providing equitable bene-
fits. Since, however, politics is in the last analysis the art of the possible, 
military pension reform will not be rational but will consist of what is left 
after an irrational period of infighting has elapsed between the executive 
branch, the legislative branch and the military special interest groups. To 
2The New York City municipal plan is a recent case in point. Due to the 
lavish benefit formula under which the total pension is close to 90% of cur-
rent pay at age 60, the plan is now facing a high actuarial deficit from a 
rash of early retirements and outmoded assumptions. Many municipal plans 
throughout the nation have benefit formula richness levels in excess of the 
probable ability of the taxpayers to fund them. Many if not most of them are 
either unfunded or severely underfunded. 
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paraphrase Congressman Aspin, "the growers of rutabagas will fight much 
harder to preserve their subsidy than the 99.9% of the American people who 
do not grow rutabagas will fight to abolish the subsidy." In spite of the 
near certainty that what might ultimately evolve in 1979 as the amended 
military pension system will bear little resemblence to this author's recom-
mendations, what follows is a sincere attempt to put order into a disordered 
program of retirement income while at the same time attempting to solve a 
larger problem of which the retirement plan is but a small part. 
The Benefit Formula 
The President's Commission on Military Compensation chose the benefit 
formula of the federal civil service, as did Congressman Aspin in April of 
1977, to provide the retirement annuities to the military.3 Under this formula 
pension credits are awarded as a percentage of pay times years of service which 
increases from 2% to 2.75% as years of service increase from 1 to 35. Applica-
tion of this formula to a realistic career will result in a benefit level very 
much better than the norm that exists in the plans of private enterprise. 4 More-
over, there is logic in a merger of this type. First, the vast majority of all 
government employees would be under the same basic benefit formula, a step 
toward uniformity. 5 Second, such a merger might preempt any opportunity for the 
lobby groups to allege the charge of inadequate benefits. Third, there probably 
3 Supra, Chapter III. 
4 Supra, Chapter I. Table 1-2. 
5Members of Congress, federal judges, the chief .executive, and certain 
other small groups have various other basic plans. Sid Taylor of the National 
Taxpayers Union estimates the total number to be 62. 
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is an "X" factor in all types of military employment, especially among those 
who are married, which is deserving of some degree of special recognition. 
Under this ideal plan, however, certain segments of the uniformed 
forces would be entitled to extra pension credits. These segments would con-
sist of the holders of the combat MOS classifications and would number 10% to 
15% of the total force of 2.1 million. The categories would include those 
of infantry, armor and amphibious duties; artillery, gunnery, rocket and mis-
sileareas; combat engineering, combat air crews, and certain seamanship 
. 1 . 6 specia ties. The exact method in which this extra allocation should be f ac-
tored into the benefit formula is unimportant. 7 There are an infinite number 
of ways this could be done. The simplest would be an addition to the formula 
in which it would be stated that for each year of qualified combat MOS ser-
vice, the percentage of )Jay multiplier would be increased by 50% or some such 
percentage which would be acceptable and just. It should be remembered that 
the Defense Manpower Commission package recommended a bonus allocation for 
combat service but based on a point system. Either method is perfectly 
acceptable. 8 
6Preliminary results of a GAO study not yet. published and supplied to 
CBO show that only 8% of the career of the average enlisted retiree was spent 
in the most physically demanding jobs. Of all enlisted retirees. 80% spent 
no time at all in these jobs. For officers, the survey showed the average 
retiree spent 34% of his career in a job directly involving tactical oper-
ations while 30% of all officer retirees spent no time at all in such jobs. 
See CBO, The Military Retirement System: Options for Change, op. cit., pp. 
11-12. 
7It has been suggested that such an idea would be difficult to implement 
because of the difficulty in the identification of the combat MOS -- an idea 
which the author rejects as nonsense. In fiscal year 1976, for example, some 
$60 million was paid to more than 25,000 enlistees as combat bonus. Presumably 
some criteria were used to identify them. 
8supra, Chapter IV. Table 4-1. 
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There are practical and compelling reasons for the adoption of such 
a weighting mechanism. First, there is grave deficiency of men in the combat 
arms, a deficiency projected to worsen both in numbers and in quality. Whereas, 
the cost of recruiting the least hardest to get volunteer to the average is 
approximately $1,250 for DoD as a whole, the incremental cost of the most 
difficult-to-get recruit in the Army can go to $12,000. Also the high bonus 
costs which have proven to be necessary to attract recruits into the combat 
areas -- more than $60 million was paid to 25,000 recruits in fiscal year 1976, 
is a further indication that even current high rates of military pay are inade-
quate to attract recruits into combat MOS classifications. 9 It is highly pro-
bable that there is now a critical deficiency in the qualitative makeup of the 
AVF which is submerged beneath the same can-do mentality that was expressed by 
the high ranking military during Vietnam, in the form of misleading and false 
declarations of "light at the end of the tunnel. 11 We must be prepared to expect 
little in time of national crisis or danger from the thousands of present day 
combat personnel who joined the force for a monetary night's lodging. The 
disbursement of a combat bonus does not beget the quality of patriotism. 
This writer believes, as does a growing body of critics, that the 
All-Volunteer Army is essentially a peace time force which would be of little 
value should it be called upon to project the foreign policy of the nation by 
10 force of arms. The military retirement plan, no matter how it is designed 
or what it provides, will not remake the armed services -- only a fool would 
9
senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed 
Services, The All-Volunteer Armed Force, op. cit., p. 8. 
10 See the recent 377 page study by Rep. Robin Beard, R-Tenn, on the lack 
of combat readiness of the AVF. See especially Senate Subcommittee on Man-
power and Personnel, The All-Volunteer Armed Force, op. cit., pp. 1-55. 
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think as much, although many of the highest military have indicated that 
substantive modification would destroy it. But perhaps the combat weighting 
device would encourage substantial numbers of careerists to volunteer for 
high risk service. This latter idea is not new among other modern day armed 
forces. The French for instance, weight their plan for campaigns. It is 
in the armed forces of the Soviet Union, however, that maximum use of the 
retirement plan is made for hazardous duty credit. The Soviet military has 
a retirement system which has strong overtones of the Defense Manpower Com-
mission package in the manner in which combat service is fed into the benefit 
formula. 11 There the plan is designed to exert a maximum influence where, 
in the Russian mind apparently, it is most needed and deserved -- namely the 
special risk categories. In the best tradition of sound pension design, its 
provisions are simple and direct: 
Officer Kotov served from September 1936 to October 1938 
and from June 1941 through August 1971. From July 1942 to April 
1958 he was on flying status, including the period May 1943 to 
February 1945 at the front, and from June 1945 to December 1952 on 
isolated Kanchatka Penninsula. Thus, he actually served for thirty 
two years and three months. 
His one year and nine months at the front counts triple. 
His time on Kanchatka counts double, but only after September 1945. 
His flying time counts time and a half. Adding it all up he has 
forty-six earned years for his pension. He will get fifty percent 
of his last pay for serving twenty-five years, plus three percent 
for each extra year up to seventy-five percent of his last pay.12 
Sad to say, the President's Commission did not see fit to include in 
its recommendations this badly needed device. Overall, there is no contradic-
tion in the awarding of dissimilar credits to different groups within the 
11op. cit., DMC Study, Table 4-1. 
12Harriet Fast Scott, "The Military Profession in the Soviet Union," 
Air Force Magazine, March 1976. p. 81. 
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military -- and the integrated, excess type plans of private industry. There, 
one level of pension credit is given on compensation not exceeding the Social 
Security wage base; and another, higher level is given on compensation above 
the wage base. The granting of extra credits to combat personnel reflects a 
somewhat similar philosophy. 
Secondary Plan Provisions 
In pension design, once the benefit formula and eligibility provi-
sions have been defined and tested, and after computerized projections have 
yielded the necessary cost projections, the secondary provisions can be added. 
Here, the ideal military plan could contain the provisions of several of the 
reform packages enunciated in Chapter IV and summarized in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. 
Most would ag~ee that the ideal plan should be integrated with Social 
Security, indeed it is wasteful and inequitable if it should not. Most would 
agree that short service personnel should have access to benefits at service 
separation perhaps along the lines suggested by the Commission and described 
in Table 4-4. To fail to do so would result in an inequity. A more difficult 
question is that of whether the new plan should be contributory. That since 
the benefit formula is similar to that of the civil service plan and since the 
civilian federal employee contributes 7% of his pay towards his cost, why 
should not his military counterpart? There are at least three reasons why he 
should not: first, to suggest a contribution would raise the spectre of a 
further erosion of benefits; second, the military constituency would request 
and secure a pay increase ~qual to the contribution; and third, on an actuarial 
basis the 7% contribution is quantitavely meaningless. 
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As to the commencement date of the annuity, the recommendations of 
the Carter Commission are superb. As quoted in the epigraph of Chapter IV, 
by delaying the commencement of old age annuities until age 55 at the earliest, 
the quick "20 and out" pension has been effectively eliminated. This leaves 
for consideration the two most difficult questions: 
(1) What is the obligation of the nation to the military retiree 
for the period between his actual retirement and the commencement of his annuity? 
(2) Can the nation, in the new climate of 5% 9% inflation, continue 
to protect the_military retiree from the declining purchasing power of ·the 
dollar? 
The Deferred Compensation Trust Fund 
The President's Commission introduced a new and very expensive trust 
fund to be created for two purposes. First, it is intended to assist separated 
personnel in their transition to civilian employment, and second to furnish a 
source of income during the "blackout period" from date of separation to the 
commencement of the old age military annuity beginning at the earliest at 55. 13 
While this feature is new, there has always been in effect a severance pay for 
involuntarily separated officers which has provided substantial sums.14 The 
Commission plan would extend this benefit to enlisted men. 
A search of the available data bearing upon transitory benefits such 
as the deferred compensation fund in the military plans of other states reveals 
nothing of comparable scope or magnitude. 15 Nor did the Commission in its full 
13 Supra, Chapter 4. Table 4-3. 
14 
Supra, Chapter 4. Table 4-4. 
15u. s. Department of Defense. The Third Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation. Vol. IX. Sample Foreign Pay Systems. December 1976. Washington, D. C. 
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report see fit to offer a citation to any precedent. The citizenry is thus 
left, should the Carter Commission recommendations be implemented, of pro-
viding benefits reaching higher than $150,000 for a departing officer in 
addition to a severance pay allowance of possibly more than $32,000. The 
Federal Republic of Germany, whose military retirement plan contains a maximum 
pension as a percentage of pay of 75%, has a separation allowance based on 
years of service times 3/4 pay.16 
Years of Service 
4 - 6 
6 - 8 
8 - 12 
Over 12 
Allowance Times 3/4 Pay 
6 months 
1 year 
1 1/2 years 
3 years 
Thus, our chief NATO ally pays at a maximum the sum equal to three times 3/4 
annual pay as a transitfon benefit.17 
Canada pays a sum much lower. The Canadian model is a gratuity for 
under 10 years of service equal to 1/2 weekly salary times years of service. 
For service of 10 - 20 years, the gratuity consits of weekly salary times years 
of service.18 Of the eight states analyzed, six have some kind of transition 
allowance while the practice of Sweden is unknown. Again, the ideal plan 
would contain an equitable but not excessive allowance. Commission data reveal 
that some 85% of American military retirees require no more than 12 months to 
16Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18
rbid. The Third Qqadrennial Review contains voluminous but incomplete 
data for the military forces of U. S., U. K., Canada, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sweden, Japan, France and Australia. 
locate new work. 19 If this is true the allowance of up to $182,000 for a 
transition of such short duration is excessive. Private industry gives to 
involuntarily separated wage earners perhaps two weeks' pay and executives 
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no more than six months' salary. Clearly then the recommendations of the 
Carter Commission are excessive in this area. Such a fund was never postu-
lated in any previous major reform package. The magnitude of the recommenda-
tions have no basis in either logic or equity. 
Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
The reader has been treated by now to an unambiguous position, a 
firmly taken stand on the question of the continuation of the CPI indexed 
cost-of-living adjustments for the American military. The Carter Commission, 
in recommending the continuation of this protection, did so briefly and suc-
cinctly with a very incomplete rationale. 20 In a 205-page report, it devoted 
but 14 lines to the most expensive single component of the American military 
retirement plan; for even under the very modest inflation projection of 5%, 
some $292 billion will be paid out between 1975 and 2000 due to the CPI 
index tie-on to the military retirees alone. 
The question is, what is the identity of the rationale, the moral 
or logical justification for the luxury of such a device for four million 
federal employees, divided approximately between the military and civilian 
civil service? There can be no question of the inequity for the one half 
of the American labor force who pays 98% of the military pension costs and who 
are themselves without private pension coverage of any description. 
19Report of the President's Commission, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
20ibid., p. 66. 
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Largely because of the generous inflationary adjustments to current 
wages and salaries of the federal establishment plus the automatic adjustments 
to both the military and civilian retirement community in the area, Washington 
has become the highest per capita income city in the nation. It has a house-
hold income of $28,000 per year. One fourth of the total work force of the 
area is federally employed with an average income of $20,000. 21 It has been 
estimated that due to the complex manner in which federal pay has been based 
on the idea of "comparability", there is now a federal wage advantage of as 
much as 20%. 
If there are to be savings from the ultimate modification of the 
military retirement there must be a reduction or curtailment of benefits. 
Most of the alternates illustrated in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 project savings only 
far into the future and:relatively small sums until the turn of the century. 
It is difficult and perhaps even inequitable to cut or curtail benefits for 
those personnel who presently are in the force or on the retired rolls. While 
this is true of most of the types of benefits present in a retirement plan it 
should not be germane to the decoupling of the CPI index from the pensions of 
either military or civilian civil service retirees. What was merely unwise 
in the era of 3% annual inflation is highly dangerous in times of 9% inflation. 
It is the magnitude and manner of this type of inflation protection that is 
unique. 
21 There is evidence of public resentment directed at both the opulence and 
power of the federal bureaucracy and ostentatiousness of Washington. For 
example, Harpers magazine recently devoted its cover story to the wealth of the 
capital city. (Tom Bethell, "The Weal.th of Washington," Harpers, June 1978. 
p. 48) See especially a superb discussion of the inequity of the percentage 
principle in inflationary wage increases for the federal civil servant in Newsweek, 
"Our Unfair Pay Raises," March 13, 1978, p. 19. There, author Paul E. Mullinax 
argues for a flat amount principle as did military retiree Everett H. Clark in 
Exhibit III of the Appendix, as a more equitable and economical manner to com-
pensate for inflation. 
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In the last analysis, however, no one should without qualification 
predict the future course of a sensitive political issue such as military 
pension reform. It was thought, for example, that Congress would address 
the issue during the second session of 1977. However, the Congress had been 
flooded with legislation introduced by an over zealous executive branch. As 
mentioned earlier, it was in April of 1977 that Congressman Les Aspin intro-
duced his "trial balloon" in a floor motion and it was noted at that time 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had privately urged the subcommittee members 
to delay pension reform for another year because of critical morale problems 
and the threat of military unionization. It is now possible, however, that 
more serious events have overtaken pension reform, namely the state of the 
All-Volunteer Army itself. The reader has noticed the secondary theme, 
implicitly and explicitly expressed throughout this thesis, that the future 
of the AVF is clouded and that its days are numbered. There is a distinct 
possibility that the Joint Chiefs have understated the deterioration of the 
service arms and that the armed forces cannot in the immediate future sur-
vive simultaneously a radical reorganization accompanied by a complete or 
partial return to the draft -- and a revision of the military pension system.22 
It is not a pleasant thought. 
22on June 25, Senator Harry Byrd, ranking member of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, released a statement to the principal newspapers of 
Virginia. This news release coincided with completion of the last half of 
the final chapter of the author's thesis. Senator Byrd stated that he is 
now experiencing grave doubts as to the viability of the AVF -- citing rising 
manpower costs, high cost of recruitment, excessive attrition, etc. The 
sense of his article was to the effect that alternatives to the AVF were 
being investigated and that the possibility exists that a return to the 
draft or some form of national services would be necessitated. (Senator 
Harry F. Byrd, Jr., "Volunteerism Isn't Working," Richmond Times Dispatch, 
June 25, 1978, Sec. G, p. 7.) 
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EXHIBIT II 
THE BANKERS LI FE [~ 
Mr, Shelton Clarke, Jr. 
The Home Life Insurance Company 
253 Broadway 
New York, New York 10007 
Dear Mr. Clarke: 
ROBERT L. DUNN 
Special Representative 
P.O. BOX 85 
ROSSVILLE. GEORGIA 30741 
PHONE: (615) 266-6795 RES. (404) 866-2038 
12 October 1977 
Your excellent article entitled, "The United States Military Pension System - To Halt 
A Runaway," appearing in the October 1977 issue ofC,L,U, was most interesting to me 
for two reasons: (1) I am a-Military Retiree and (2) I am a Professional Life Under-
writer. 
In June 1963, I retired from USAF with twenty-seven years service with the rank of Major. 
Sixty days prior to my retirement the Congress made a major change in the Military 
Retirement Law. That drastic change as of now reduces by $4,800,00 my annual annuity. 
That drastic reduction of benefits occurred at the end of a long career during a period 
when the WWII personnel hump was retiring. To place that drastic reduction of benefits 
in sharp focus, a Chief Master Sergeant with the same length of service retiring today 
receives benefits equal to mine, If the Cost of Living Index had not been included in 
the Act of 1963, my annuity would be about equal to a Buck Sergeant retiring today. 
Will the Pension Reform Act of 1974 permit a Pension Plan which has been effect for 
twenty-seven years to make drastic reductions in benef tis the year a large number of 
covered personnel are scheduled to retire? Would the Congress even consider drastic 
reductions in Social Security Benefits the year an extremely large number of citizens 
retire? I do not think so. Should the people of the United States be less fair with 
their Military Personnel who have Borne the Battle? 
You are aware of the fact that for the past several years the Military Retiree has lost 
significant benefits. 
It seems to me that Retired Military Personnel deserve to be able to plan with confidence 
for their golden years without having to worry about more benefits being taken from them 
on a month to month basis. 
BANKERS LIFE COMPANY I HOME OFFICE I DES MOINES. IOWA 50307 
THE BANKERS LI FE 
Mr. Shelton Clarke, Jr. - conti.nued -
Would you please take the time to explain 
problem of the Pre 19"64 Military Retiree? 
on that problem. 
ROBERT L. DUNN 
Special Representative 
P. 0. BOX 85 
ROSSVILLE, GEORGIA 30741 
PHONE: (615) 266-0795 RES. (404) 866-2038 
11 October 1977 
to me how you propose to deal with the 
I will be most grateful for your thoughts 
Sincerely, 
,/' ,.· /' ,,, 
> -, ,, .. ,, , / - • ~ 
t ... -<.,. - "' ... .:. 
/ ..... __ 
, .. Robert L. Dunn 
P,S. If a Military Retiree pays more in Federal Income taxes than he receives in a 
Military Annuity, is he really costing his fellow citizens anything? It would be 
interesting to know the total amount of Federal and State Income Taxes paid by all 
Military Retirees, If you deducted that amount from the total cost of the program, 
wouldn't you really have the true cost of the Military Retirement Program? 
CF: 
C,L,U. Journal 
2 
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EXHIBIT .. nr 
N'E >v .y c R 1< r 1 M t. s 
S, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 19i5 
·L·etters to the E 
. ··.· 
Cost-of-Living R_aises: Windfall or Pittan~e 
.To the Editor: 
As a citizen f am disturbed by the 
spread of the cost-of-living adjustment 
(COLA) .. into labor unions a.Dd now 
into the salaries of judges, top officials 
of the executive branch and probaibly 
Congressmen. . ·' _. •. 
Although benefiting from it myself 
a.s a miliwy ·re~. l have become 
convinced that it is essentially a give-
. away program_ which~ dispenses too 
. much to those who don't need it and 
, not enough to . those who- do.. . , 
~·-~.The application at· pea:entaoe. in- .• - .. : 
· = .•. creases in the Consumer: Priee., Index . 
, 
· .. 
.. 
. .'·. '(C-P.I.) : aaoss Federal .pay· scales, ~ · '..·".:-:~ · . 
: high and ·1ow,. is .an undeserv~ and · · .· - · · · . · 
. excessive Windfall for the above.aver- : "bigh end can well a!!ard to Ji.ave it. 
e.ge and an. un!.a.ir. pittance . at ,the .... that way. . . . . . 
lower· end.. : · ·· .-···:~ _. ·. ·.~ :;/ .. _ _.,:· ·· .. : . The present di.scrlminating and un-
A 5 pereent increase'. iii' the · C-P.L : · bal~ccd ~djustments are highly . ll!-
would raise a Congressional salary by . fiaoonary 1.11 themselves. Labor Bureau 
$186 a montho enough to pay for aU ·. su.tisti~ quoted -?Y The Tu_nes last 
groceries and basic needs,. not-just- ,.,_July gave COLA figures veenng from 
the inflationary extra, bur 'woWd 'give - .22 C1!llts an hour to Sl.05; that's from . 
the S 150 Social Security . beneficiary · $8.~o. to S42. a : w~k l>f forty ~ours, 
only $7.50, not even enough for one a ndiculous indication of the kmd of 
fJ.lling of the ga.s t.aJlk of his jalopy, if · ea>nomic football ~e _device has 
he owns one.... '.. - .. ·. , . · · • become. · . · ·· ·· · .. · . 
The fact is that the c.P.L has a · ·In my own.~· I "have t>een gla_d 
•reverse relationship to salary level. . to get these rais~s. B1:1t enough is 
and the tragedy is that when each enough, and 1 don t~ bel~eve .the gen-
is expressed in percenta.ge"it is easy ~ really need their grant increase9-· 
.to ·slide into the assumption that the while the se~eants have to scramble 
more pay you get and spend. the mon: fo~ p~st-ret.irement. Jobs Ol" go on 
compensation you need to stay caught re!Aietf. n . . r b 
u · a guess.. a at mc.rease o a out 
p. . . 
1 
• $20 a month would be ample for every-
·- This 1s n~ense. Who says th~ al- body to cover ~ actual ~ after 
fluent need it? . . ' .- ·a 5 percent c.P.L rise. Anything above 
What needs to be said. and loudly. . that is just. money thrown out to 
is that my cost-of-living adjustment ·people who don't need it. 
should be a fiat rate a.cross the board · "'"· EVUEIT H. CL.UU<: 
because_ the low _epd needs it and !-!le .. TtmkhaMock, Pa.. Sept. 12, 1976 .., 
. ··-·-· 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The following bibliography is select in the sense that it lists 
those sources that contributed measurably to the foregoing narrative. 
With one exception, these primary sources were written within the last 
two years. The cited works are not large numerically. However, the books, 
reports, papers and studies which comprise them were carefully chosen. As 
of the time when it became necessary to "close down" the research for this 
theses it was felt that the most authoritative collection of source material 
had been assembled. That time came in April 1978 when the Report of the 
President's Connnission on Military Compensation was released. 
Contrary to the normal procedure, this brief section is listed 
in the order of direct, meaningful and inspirational utility to the author. 
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